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The Science of Administrative Change
BARRY SULLIVAN & CHRISTINE KEXEL CHABOT
Donald Trump repeatedly vowed to reduce regulation during the 2016
presidential campaign. Indeed, one of his key advisors promised to “deconstruct”
the administrative state. Since taking office, President Trump has attempted to make
good on his promises, spurring federal agencies to brush aside countless
regulations that previous administrations had promulgated based on scientific,
technological, or economic evidence. Those efforts, which some have dubbed a
“war on science,” implicate a long-contested question in administrative law: to
what extent should a change in presidential administrations excuse agencies from
any obligation to justify changes in policy with expert, reasoned analysis of relevant
data? Perhaps surprisingly, the Trump Administration’s efforts align with views
that have dominated administrative law scholarship in recent decades. By the time
President Trump took office, many leading administrative law scholars had already
championed enhanced presidential control over agency decisions, dismissed expert
analysis as an anachronistic relic of the New Deal, and suggested that the
considered judgments of previous administrations should be amenable to quick and
easy change.
This Article takes a contrary view and asserts a renewed role for expert,
reasoned analysis in the face of politically motivated administrative change. Unlike
earlier work, this Article identifies change as a fundamental and essential aspect of
much expert decision making, and it explains that regulatory statutes often call for
an exercise of expert judgment capable of incorporating frequently changing bodies
of scientific, technological, or economic knowledge. This positive procedural
account of agency decision making shows that the reasoned analysis contributed by
agency expertise is far from superfluous, but helps give legitimacy and transparency
to administrative government. By identifying the value of expertise within the
context of politically directed policy changes, this Article addresses an
under-theorized aspect of judicial review of agency decisions and reinforces the
need for agencies to support changes in policy with reasoned, expert analysis.
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The Science of Administrative Change
BARRY SULLIVAN * & CHRISTINE KEXEL CHABOT **

INTRODUCTION
By spurring administrative agencies to roll back a spate of important
regulations, the Trump Administration has followed through on its 2016
campaign promises. These rollbacks seek to undo regulations that were put
in place to achieve a range of significant public benefits—from slowing the
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pace of global warming to eliminating water pollution and ensuring net
neutrality.3 In carrying out its deregulatory program, one of the hallmarks of
the Trump Administration’s approach has been to summarily reject relevant
economic or scientific information, claiming that the harm calling for
regulation does not exist.4 This strategy, which has been described as a “war
on science,” manifests a “reflexively antiregulatory mind-set” and a belief
that scientific evidence of phenomena such as global warming is, in the
President’s own words, a “hoax.”5 To further this strategy, the President has
appointed agency heads eager to implement his deregulatory philosophy,
whatever the facts might be. These aggressive deregulatory efforts provide
a salient example of government as the exercise of raw political will and
implicate a long-contested issue in administrative law: to what extent may
the exercise of political will justify immediate policy change and eliminate
the need for agencies to engage in expert, reasoned analysis of relevant
scientific, technological, or economic evidence before altering existing
policy? This Article addresses the conflict between political will and
informed expert analysis in the context of judicial review of administrative
change. It argues that expert analysis has a positive, distinctive, and essential
role to play.
Of course, President Trump’s desire to bend regulatory outcomes to
political goals is hardly unique. Nor is that desire one that manifests itself
only in Republican administrations.6 Perhaps surprisingly, an early
proponent of “political supremacy”—a strong, centralized executive power
to effectuate regulatory change—was none other than now-Justice Elena
Kagan.7 In a 2001 article, then-Professor Kagan praised the degree of control
1
Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 28, 2017) (calling for a rulemaking to undo
the Clean Power Plan’s limitations on carbon emissions and “immediate[] review” of regulations that
may “burden the development or use of domestically produced energy”); Repeal of the Clean Power
Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Existing Electric Utility Generating
Units; Revisions to Emission Guidelines Implementing Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520 (July 8, 2019)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
2
Also in response to an Executive Order, the EPA embarked on a series of rulemakings to undo
water pollution limitations established by the Obama Administration’s 2015 Waters of the United States
rule. See infra notes 78–99 and accompanying text.
3
Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. 311, 353, ¶ 263 (2018).
4
See infra discussion in Part II. Another key strategy has been to limit the overall scope of agency
regulatory power. See generally Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court, 2016 Term — Foreword: 1930s
Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 H ARV . L. REV . 1, 7 (2017); Cass R. Sunstein &
Adrian Vermeule, The Morality of Administrative Law, 131 H ARV . L. REV . 1924, 1963 (2018).
5
Opinion, President Trump’s War on Science, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/09/opinion/sunday/trump-epa-pruitt-science.html.
6
Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 H ARV . L. REV . 2245, 2281 (2001) (describing
President Clinton’s efforts to shape regulatory policy).
7
See id. at 2246. Justice Kagan has not spoken about this subject in extra curial remarks since her
appointment to the Court. Christopher Edley was another early proponent of this view. See
CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY , J R ., A DMINISTRATIVE LAW : RETHINKING J UDICIAL CONTROL OF
BUREAUCRACY 183 (1990).
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that President Clinton exercised over administrative agencies: “[Clinton]
developed a set of practices that enhanced his ability to influence or even
dictate the content of administrative initiatives.”8 While leading scholars
have argued for9 and against10 enhanced presidential control over
administrative decisions, scholars on both sides have dismissed expert
analysis as an anachronistic relic of the New Deal.11 In addition, the Supreme
Court has failed to form a stable majority on the essential question whether
political will or expert analysis should take precedence, or on how the two
values should be harmonized in the context of administrative change.12
Some Justices have emphasized the importance of “expert discretion”13 in
administrative decision making, while others have focused on unfettered
political control.14 While the latter group of Justices aligns with the dominant
administrative law theory of recent decades (presidential control),15 those
Justices who value expertise will find in the scholarly literature only an
8

Kagan, supra note 6, at 2282.
See EDLEY, supra note 7, at 183; Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary
and Capricious Review, 119 Y ALE L.J. 2, 2 (2009); cf. Randy J. Kozel & Jeffrey A. Pojanowski,
Administrative Change, 59 UCLA L. REV . 112, 160 (2011) (arguing for greater deference to policy
change which does not involve interpretation of law); see generally Daniel A. Farber, Presidential
Administration Under Trump 1–5 (Aug. 9, 2017) (gathering sources in an unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3015591.
10
In response to Kathryn Watts’s 2009 article, several commentators have advocated a continued
role for reasoned decision making as a check on political decisions. See Mark Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance
of Politics For Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 90 WASH . U. L. REV . 141, 153 (2012) (“Review for
reasoned decision-making . . . is best explained by the interest group model of the administrative state.”);
Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in American Administrative Law: Power, Rationality, and Reasons, 61
D UKE L.J. 1811, 1816 (2012) (rejecting political control in favor of a “sociological theory” that
“demonstrates how reason giving shapes agencies through their organizational structures”); Glen
Staszewski, Political Reasons, Deliberative Democracy, and Administrative Law, 97 I OWA L. REV . 849,
852 (2012) (advancing a “deliberative theory of administrative legitimacy”). A more recent article argues
for checks based on the rule of law value of consistency. See William W. Buzbee, The Tethered
President: Consistency and Contingency in Administrative Law, 98 B.U. L. REV . 1357, 1358 (2018).
11
See, e.g., Seidenfeld, supra note 10, at 148 (supporting “reasoned decision-making review” on
the ground that it “is not a vestige of the expertise model”); Watts, supra note 9, at 13 (critiquing reasoned
decision making review as resting on “an outmoded model of ‘expert’ decision-making”).
12
Compare Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 54 (1983) (NHTSA failed to “bring its expertise to bear on the question” when rejecting safety
benefits of automatic detachable seatbelts), with id. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part) (a “change in
administration . . . is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency’s reappraisal” of these safety
benefits).
13
In State Farm, Justice White’s majority opinion recognized that “[e]xpert discretion is the
lifeblood of the administrative process.” Id. at 48 (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. noted that agency decisions turning on
“discoveries in science” must be “informed by the [agency’s] experience and expertise.” 556 U.S. 502,
535–36 (2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
14
State Farm, 463 U.S. at 58 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part).
15
Adrian Vermeule, Bureaucracy and Distrust: Landis, Jaffe, and Kagan on the Administrative
State, 130 H ARV . L. REV . 2463, 2478 (2017) (Presidential Administration is one of the most “prominent
articles in administrative-law theory in recent decades”); see also Short, supra note 10, at 1815 (noting
the “intellectual vogue for presidentialism”).
9
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“impoverished understanding of expertise” and a failure to identify an
important role for expertise in the face of administrative change.
This Article offers a different approach, namely, a positive procedural
account that focuses on the indispensable value of agency expertise in the
alteration of administrative policy. While previous scholarly work has
conceptualized change in terms of the President’s political energy,17 this
Article argues that change is also an essential attribute of much expert
decision making. Expert decisions often turn, not on the mastery of static
bodies of information, but on the assessment of evolving scientific,
technological, or economic knowledge. Indeed, Congress has often
acknowledged this fact by requiring agencies to make dynamic expert
decisions in a broad array of regulatory statutes, including those that require
environmental protection measures to reflect the “latest scientific
knowledge”18 or the “best technology available.”19
A positive procedural account of agency decision making also
demonstrates that administrative agencies, amongst all government
decisionmakers, are uniquely situated to incorporate evolving scientific,
technological, or economic information into sound regulatory decisions;
they are also well-positioned to balance the fits and spurts of advancing
knowledge against traditional rule of law values such as stability and
predictability.20 When a change in agency policy is considered, therefore,
the exercise of expert judgment is not a meaningless procedural obstacle to
achieving politically desired ends. Instead, agencies that exercise expert
discretion and weigh relevant data add legitimacy and transparency to the
dynamic expert determinations mandated by Congress.
16
Sidney A. Shapiro, The Failure to Understand Expertise in Administrative Law: The Problem
and the Consequences, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV . 1097, 1097 (2015). Other contemporary works that
support agency expertise focus on the importance of transparency or the challenges of regulating in the
face of scientific uncertainty. See generally RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS: REGULATION AND
THE D ISTORTION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 1 (Wendy Wagner & Rena Steinzor eds., 2006); Holly
Doremus, The Purposes, Effects, and Future of the Endangered Species Act’s Best Available Science
Mandate, 34 ENVTL. L. 397, 447 (2004); Sidney Shapiro et al., The Enlightenment of Administrative
Law: Looking Inside the Agency for Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV . 463, 463–66 (2012); Wendy
E. Wagner, A Place for Agency Expertise: Reconciling Agency Expertise with Presidential Power, 115
COLUM. L. REV. 2019, 2019 (2015) [hereinafter Wagner (2015)].
17
Kagan, supra note 6, at 2341–43.
18
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2) (2012).
19
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2012). Of course, such regulatory schemes do not
represent the entire universe of significant regulatory decisions or address distinct moral concerns raised
in areas such as immigration. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d
476, 510 (9th Cir. 2018) (rescission of DACA was “arbitrary and capricious” because it was based on
“an erroneous view of what the law required”), cert. granted sub nom., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 139 S. Ct. 2779 (2019). Still, agency decisions involving scientific,
technological, and economic analysis remain a crucial part of the work of the modern administrative
state.
20
For a discussion of why Congress, the President, and the courts cannot perform the same
functions as agencies, see infra Part II.
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The “reasoned analysis” that agencies must provide in support of
changes in policy21 provides the public with an otherwise unavailable
window into the actual basis for regulatory decisions and the tradeoffs that
government necessarily makes.22 This type of reasoned, expert analysis
stands apart from the exercise of raw political will, which may be entirely
arbitrary and opaque.23 To be sure, political direction remains important,24
and it may sometimes be necessary, among other reasons, for overcoming
the “slow pace” that has often plagued regulatory efforts.25 In addition,
ultimate solutions to some regulatory problems may be “underdetermined
by scientific data” and leave agencies free to consider political factors in
reaching a final policy decision.26 Nevertheless, expert analysis remains
“crucial”27 to an agency’s reasoned decision making obligations. A process
that gives appropriate effect to both political and expert considerations
cannot be equated with a purely political process, or to one that fails to
inform the public as to where science ends and politics begins. The Trump
Administration’s aggressive deregulatory stance incarnates the danger that
political objectives may displace expert analysis and produce results that
defy justification by reasoned analysis of relevant scientific or economic
evidence.28
The Trump Administration’s current deregulatory efforts echo those of
the Reagan Administration in the 1980s. Because the Reagan Administration
attempted to undo key regulations in a variety of areas, including
environmental protection and automobile safety, the Supreme Court had
occasion, in resolving challenges to those initiatives, to consider the proper
21

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42

(1983).
22

Administrative agencies must give reasoned explanations for their decisions and thus meet a
higher standard than the “minimum rationality a statute must bear in order to withstand analysis under
the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 43 n.9.
23
See Staszewski, supra note 10, at 860 (noting that pure “political preferences” may include
campaign promises or executive preferences).
24
See Seidenfeld, supra note 10, at 197 (explaining that politics may motivate reasoned agency
decisions).
25
Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM . L. REV . 1613,
1677 (1995) [hereinafter Wagner (1995)].
26
Doremus, supra note 16, at 447. Political considerations may ultimately, and legitimately, tip the
balance between competing solutions to a particular regulatory problem. Staszewski, supra note 10, at
899; cf. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV . 461, 464 (2003) (noting that, historically, agencies were only
thought to “execute technocratic judgments”).
27
Doremus, supra note 16, at 436.
28
See, e.g., Air All. Hous. v. EPA, 906 F.3d 1049, 1067 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (rejecting delay of
Chemical Disaster Rules based on cursory conclusions that harm caused by chemical explosions was
“speculative”); S.C. Coastal Conservation League v. Pruitt, 318 F. Supp. 3d 959, 967 (D.S.C. 2018)
(order granting summary judgment) (holding that it was “arbitrary and capricious” for the EPA to issue
a binding delay of the 2015 Waters of the United States rule without any consideration of the rule’s
merits).
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scope of agency power to alter regulations issued under congressional
mandates. On the one hand, the Court emphasized in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.29 that “[a]n initial agency
interpretation [of an ambiguous statute] is not instantly carved in stone,” and
that an agency, “within the limits of [Congress’s] delegation,” may “rely on
the incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to inform its
judgements.”30 On the other hand, in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,31 the Court delineated
important limitations on the power of the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) to alter discretionary automobile safety policies
for political reasons.
While the Court noted the importance of deferring to “expert discretion”
in both cases,32 the concept was especially relevant to the arbitrary and
capricious standard of review that the Court applied to NHTSA’s decision
in State Farm. This standard of review, which is mandated by section 706
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),33 requires a reviewing court to
“hold unlawful” agency actions that are “arbitrary and capricious.”34 In State
Farm, the Court distinguished arbitrary political choices from reasoned
decisions that could plausibly be attributed to “a difference in view or the
product of agency expertise.”35 Applying this standard, all nine Justices
rejected NHTSA’s decision to rescind a prior administration’s automobile
airbag regulations,36 where the Agency failed to offer even “one sentence”
to explain why it had come to reject the safety benefits of airbags.37
The Court split in a five-to-four vote, however, on NHTSA’s summary
rejection of data that associated safety benefits with an alternative
technology, namely, detachable automatic seatbelts. Justice White’s
majority opinion rejected the Agency’s explanation as arbitrary and
capricious, holding that the explanation was too superficial to constitute “the
29

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Id. at 863, 865.
31
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983).
32
Id. at 48 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167 (1962)); Chevron,
467 U.S. at 865 (recognizing that judges “are not experts in the field” as one reason for deferring to
agencies).
33
5 U.S.C. § 706 (2019).
34
Id.
35
State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (emphasis added).
36
This holding also aligns with dictionaries that define “arbitrary” as reflecting “individual
preference” or “tyranny” and capricious as “impulsive.” Merriam-Webster, Capricious, MERRIAMWEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/capricious (last visited Feb. 9, 2019) (arbitrary
definitions 1.b.–2.b.).
37
State Farm, 463 U.S. at 48–49; id. at 57–58 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (agreeing that the Agency erred when it “gave no explanation at all” for “eliminating the airbags
and continuous spool automatic seatbelt”).
30
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product of reasoned decisionmaking.” On the other hand, Justice
Rehnquist argued in a partial dissent that the Agency had engaged in a
rational “assess[ment of] administrative records,” and that its cursory
analysis was sufficient in light of political concerns raised by a “change in
administration.”39
The Supreme Court has not resolved the lingering tension between
Justice Rehnquist’s call for greater deference to political will and Justice
White’s insistence on reasoned decision making. The Court’s next major
decision on agency change, FCC v. Fox,40 which involved the prohibition of
“fleeting expletives” from the airwaves, may suggest to some that the Court
has moved to a more relaxed standard. But Fox did not involve the same
type of “empirical evidence” as State Farm,41 and Justice Scalia’s lead
opinion in Fox studiously avoided any reference to Justice Rehnquist’s
partial dissent in State Farm.42 In Department of Commerce v. New York,43
the Court’s most recent decision in the area, shifting coalitions of Justices
likewise failed to settle on a single arbitrary and capricious standard of
review. The Justices’ five-to-four decision to invalidate the Trump
Administration’s addition of a citizenship question to the 2020 census
revealed continued disagreement over the respective roles of political will
and expert analysis in agency decisions.44 Moreover, the broad rationale for
expert agency decision making, which once commanded widespread
support, has rested on shaky ground in recent decades.
Agency expertise was long considered an important justification for
delegating decision making authority to agencies, and even early agencies
such as the Interstate Commerce Commission were understood to exercise
expert discretion within the narrow limits of legislatively established ends.45
During the Progressive Era, Congress established the Federal Trade
Commission, which gave the Commission very broad discretion and was
thus consistent with Woodrow Wilson’s vision of a much broader role for
agency expertise. 46 By the time of the New Deal, agency expertise had
become the new orthodoxy, and, at least in the view of such luminaries as
James Landis, it was agency expertise that justified Congress’s delegation
of power to administrative agencies. While conceptions of the role of agency
expertise varied during this time, all variations assumed that agencies would
38
State Farm, 463 U.S. at 52; see also Doremus, supra note 16, at 423 (explaining that State Farm
requires analysis of relevant scientific evidence even “in the absence of an explicit legislative science
mandate”).
39
State Farm, 463 U.S. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
40
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009).
41
Id. at 519.
42
Justice Scalia spoke for a plurality of the Justices when he rejected the view that “significant
political pressure from Congress” justified heightened scrutiny of the Agency’s decision. Id. at 523.
43
Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2251 (2019).
44
Id. at 2571.
45
See infra Part I and discussion surrounding notes 159–67.
46
Id.
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exercise expert discretion objectively and free from political influence. More
recently, that has changed.
The idea that objective expertise supplies an adequate justification for
delegations of broad power to administrative agencies has been under attack
for various reasons since the late 1930s. Calls by the legal and business
communities for increased procedural controls over administrative agencies
culminated in the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946. By
the 1960s and the 1970s, concerns over agency capture had further eroded
support for the agency expertise rationale. Although Congress continued to
delegate expert questions to agencies in new environmental and safety
legislation in the 1970s, by then the objective expertise rationale for agency
decision making had largely been discredited. Without any strong theoretical
basis for the exercise of agency expertise, leading scholars began to argue
that the justification for agency discretion rested in its capacity for advancing
political concerns, especially those of the President.47 As a result of this
larger theoretical shift away from expertise and toward politics, it is not
surprising that leading administrative law scholars have questioned State
Farm’s majority holding and voiced support for regulatory change justified
only by a new President’s political priorities.48 This Article takes a contrary
view and argues that expertise and reasoned analysis of relevant evidence
still serve an essential purpose in agency decision making, even when they
cannot point to a single, objective answer in a particular case.
The Article develops its argument for the importance of agency
expertise in administrative change as follows. Part I recounts the extent to
which raw politics have replaced expert analysis under the Trump
Administration. Part II outlines the historical rise and fall of expertise as a
general theoretical justification for delegations of power to administrative
agencies. Part III introduces the science of administrative change. It offers a
positive procedural account of administrative change and identifies the
unique advantages of agency decision making. No other actor in our system
is equally qualified to formulate regulatory policy involving dynamic
questions of science, technology, or economics. Part IV describes the
Justices’ divergent views on the importance of expertise in administrative
change. Part V discusses the ongoing debate about the extent to which
political will should be allowed to supplant expertise as a justification for an
agency’s change in policy and shows how expert justifications for change
provide a unique opportunity to increase the legitimacy and transparency of
regulatory decision making. The Article concludes by arguing that courts
should continue to insist on expert decision making and reasoned analysis
of relevant record evidence to support changes in policy, regardless of
whether the changes are intended to rollback or enhance the general level of
47

See Kagan, supra note 6, at 2320 (arguing that statutes giving discretion to executive branch
officials should be interpreted as granting final decision making authority to the President).
48
See supra notes 9–11.
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regulation. If, on the other hand, courts allow politics to supplant expert
discretion, they will strip the regulatory system of the transparency and
legitimacy that agency expertise provides.
I. THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION HAS SUBSTITUTED POLITICAL WILL FOR
EXPERT ANALYSIS
In the 2017 presidential transition, the Obama Administration prepared
extensive briefing materials on the workings of the federal government and
offered to make its officials available to meet with the Trump transition
team.49 It is now well known that the Trump transition team ignored those
materials, spurned opportunities to meet with Obama Administration
officials, and displayed little interest in learning about the inner workings of
the agencies they were about to begin running.50 Having campaigned against
federal regulation, President Trump remained hostile to the agencies’ basic
missions during the transition.51
On President Trump’s first day in office, his Chief of Staff directed
executive agency heads to freeze all pending, non-finalized regulations.52 In
addition, the Chief of Staff urged a presumptive delay for all recently
published rules with future effective dates to allow the new Administration
to reconsider all “questions of fact, law, or policy” that the Obama
Administration had decided in promulgating those regulations.53 Ten days
later, President Trump issued an Executive Order directing agencies to
49

Russell Berman, ‘The Most Important Takeover of Any Organization in History’: Inside the
Years-Long Push to Perfect the Presidential Transition, ATLANTIC (Apr. 22, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/04/improving-the-presidential-transition2016/477528/.
50
Few Trump transition officials appear to have made contact with outgoing officials. See
MICHAEL LEWIS, THE FIFTH RISK 40 (2018) (“‘We had tried desperately to prepare them,’ said Tarak
Shah, chief of staff for the DOE’s $6 billion basic-science program. ‘But that required them to show up.
. . . [T]hey didn’t [show up or] ask for even an introductory briefing.’”).
51
Meg Jacobs, Trump is Appointing People Who Hate the Agencies They Will Lead, CNN (Dec.
12, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/12/10/opinions/government-is-the-problem-jacobs/index.html.
52
Reince Priebus, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, WHITE
HOUSE (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/memorandum-headsexecutive-departments-agencies/. Such directives have become common. The Clinton, George W. Bush,
and Obama Administrations also moved promptly to freeze non-finalized regulations. See Memorandum
for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4435 (Jan. 26, 2009) (instructing
President Obama’s appointees and designees to withdraw, review, and approve unpublished pending or
final rules before permitting publication in the Federal Register Notice); Memorandum for the Heads and
Acting Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 66 Fed. Reg. 7702 (Jan. 24, 2001) (instructing
agency heads to withdraw new or pending regulations); Regulatory Review Notice, 58 Fed. Reg. 6074
(Jan. 25, 1993) (instructing President Clinton’s appointees to review and approve any regulations that
had been submitted to the Federal Register but not yet published). President Reagan issued a more limited
freeze order. See Ronald Reagan, Memorandum Postponing Pending Federal Regulations, RONALD
REAGAN
PRESIDENTIAL
LIBR.
&
MUSEUM
(Jan.
29,
1981),
https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/12981e (postponing rulemaking for sixty days).
53
Priebus, supra note 52.
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eliminate two existing regulations for every new regulation they intended to
promulgate, thus focusing regulatory efforts on the elimination of costs.54
Only a few months into his term, President Trump ordered agencies to
rescind or revise the “most important Obama era rules” on environmental
protection,55 including the carbon emissions limitations in the Clean Power
Plan56 and the regulation of water pollution in the so-called Waters of the
United States (WOTUS) Rule.57 The Administration also worked with
Congress to permanently rescind fourteen recently adopted Obama-era
regulations under the Congressional Review Act.58
President Trump’s agency heads embraced these policy directives.
Many, such as former EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt, came to office with a
history of hostility to the very laws and regulations they would be charged
with enforcing.59 Other incoming Trump Administration officials also
voiced hostility to the regulatory missions of the agencies they would be
directing,60 and the low value they placed on professional analysis seems to
have contributed to an early “exodus” of expert staff.61
President Trump’s agency heads made numerous decisions that
prioritized political goals over expert analysis of data.62 Lisa Heinzerling has
described these initial regulatory rollbacks as a “display of autocracy,
54

Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Jan. 30, 2017).
Daniel A. Farber, Trump, EPA, and the Anti-Regulatory State, REG. REV. (Jan. 24, 2018),
https://www.theregreview.org/2018/01/24/farber-trump-epa-anti-regulatory-state/.
56
Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 28, 2017) (directing executive agencies to
“immediately review existing regulations that potentially burden the development or use of domestically
produced energy” and as “soon as practicable . . . publish for notice and comment proposed rules
suspending, revising, or rescinding” the Clean Power Plan).
57
Exec. Order No. 13,778, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,497, § 2 (Feb. 28, 2017) (directing governing agencies
to “publish for notice and comment a proposed rule rescinding or revising” the WOTUS Rule, “as
appropriate and consistent with law”).
58
Stephen Dinan, GOP Rolled Back 14 of 15 Obama Rules Using Congressional Review Act,
WASH. TIMES (May 15, 2017), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/may/15/gop-rolled-back14-of-15-obama-rules-using-congres/.
59
Doina Chiacu, Trump to Nominate Pruitt to Lead U.S. Environmental Agency: Statement,
REUTERS (Dec. 8, 2016, 6:21 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-epaidUSKBN13X15S (“Pruitt . . . has launched multiple lawsuits against regulations put forward by the
agency he is now poised to lead, suing to block federal measures to reduce smog and curb toxic emissions
from power plants.”); Valerie Volcovici & Timothy Gardner, Trump Picks Foe of Obama Climate
Agenda to Run EPA, SCI . AM. (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/trump-picksfoe-of-obama-climate-agenda-to-run-epa/.
60
LEWIS, supra note 50, at 42 (noting that incoming Trump staff mocked regulatory work as
“stupid”).
61
Id. at 50 (noting loss of expert staff); Short, supra note 10, at 1869 (predicting that a “political”
framework could drive out “professional” or “expert” agency staff by “undermin[ing]” their “motivation”
to work in a system that values expertise).
62
Cf. Coral Davenport, In the Trump Administration, Science is Unwelcome. So is Advice, N.Y.
TIMES (June 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/09/climate/trump-administration-science.html
(“The lack of traditional scientific advisory leadership in the White House is one example of a significant
change in the Trump administration: the marginalization of science in shaping United States policy.”).
55
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impulsivity, and jerry-rigged reasoning” that gave “little attention” to legal
requirements of “process” or “reason giving.”63 In a number of early
regulatory rollbacks, Trump Administration officials essentially made up
their minds in advance by announcing mandatory delays without the
deliberation required by standard rulemaking procedures.64 These standard
procedures, known as notice-and-comment rulemaking, are a staple of
introductory administrative law courses and are mandated by section 553 of
the APA. Under the APA, agencies that wish to change an existing rule (or
propose a new one) must (1) provide advance notice of the rule they are
proposing,65 (2) “give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the
rulemaking through submission of written data, views, or arguments,”66 and
(3) thereafter provide a “general statement” of the rule’s “basis and purpose”
(responsive to relevant and vital comments)67—all before publishing a
binding final rule in the Federal Register.68
A rule that rolls back an existing regulation without going through the
notice-and-comment procedure deprives the public of an opportunity to
learn the reasons for an agency’s decision, let alone weigh in on their
persuasiveness. The Second Circuit recently emphasized this point when it
invalidated an NHTSA rule because the Agency did not follow
notice-and-comment procedures before indefinitely delaying regulations
that increased civil penalties for violating fuel economy standards.69 Those
procedures, the court observed, “serve the public interest by providing a
forum for the robust debate of competing and frequently complicated policy
considerations having far-reaching implications” and by “foster[ing]
reasoned decisionmaking.”70
Not surprisingly, the first round of Trump Administration rollbacks has
not fared well in the courts.71 In numerous cases, judges have struck down
63

Lisa Heinzerling, Unreasonable Delays: The Legal Problems (So Far) of Trump’s Deregulatory
Binge, 12 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 13, 15–16 (2018).
64
Id. at 34 (discussing how many Trump Administration delays are an unlawful “end run around
the notice and comment process”); id. at 16 (discussing decisions that “involved delaying or suspending
the effective dates” of Obama era rules).
65
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (2012). Courts have also required agencies to disclose outside scientific
studies for comment in rulemaking. United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251
(2d Cir. 1977).
66
5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012).
67
Id.; see Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d at 253 (requiring the Agency to respond to
comment questioning the viability of the canned whitefish industry under the proposed rule).
68
5 U.S.C § 553(d) (2012). The APA requires publication “not less than 30 days before [a rule’s]
effective date.” Id.
69
Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 894 F.3d 95, 115 (2d Cir. 2018).
70
Id.
71
Connor Raso, Trump’s Deregulatory Efforts Keep Losing in Court—and the Losses Could Make
it Harder for Future Administrations to Deregulate, BROOKINGS (Oct. 25, 2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/trumps-deregulatory-efforts-keep-losing-in-court-and-the-lossescould-make-it-harder-for-future-administrations-to-deregulate/ (noting a five percent “win rate” on cases
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overtly political rollbacks in which agencies have unlawfully bypassed
notice-and-comment rulemaking.72 Courts have also invalidated rollbacks in
which agencies “acted against [the agency’s] own scientific findings”
without explanation,73 botched substantive legal requirements,74 or acted
arbitrarily and capriciously by “entirely fail[ing] to consider the benefits” of
rules they postponed.75 In at least one case, the Administration “tacitly
conced[ed]” its error by initiating notice-and-comment procedures after its
actions were challenged.76 Still, the agencies’ recent loss of scientists and
other expert personnel may make it difficult for them to improve their
analyses in the future.77
Many rollbacks in which the Trump Administration has used
notice-and-comment procedures to change existing rules have only recently
been finalized by the agencies.78 The Administration’s initial attempts to
repeal two major environmental regulations—the Clean Power Plan and
challenged in court). While the District of Columbia Circuit generally affirmed the FCC’s rollback of net
neutrality regulations, the court found that the FCC’s “anemic analysis” of alternative legal protections
for competition “barely survive[d] arbitrary and capricious review.” Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1,
59 (2019). The court also held that the FCC flunked arbitrary and capricious review based on its
“disregard of its duty,” “scattered and unreasoned observations,” and “non-sequiturs” with respect to
public safety concerns, pole attachments, and Lifeline subsidies for low-income consumers. Id. at 63, 65,
69, 86 (remanding without vacatur for reasoned analysis of these issues).
72
See, e.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council, 894 F.3d at 115 (rejecting argument that NHTSA had “good
cause” to circumvent notice and comment procedure when it indefinitely delayed increase in civil
penalties); Clean Air Council v. Pruitt, 862 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (vacating the EPA’s attempt to
stay a Clean Air Act regulation without “comply[ing] with” the APA’s “requirements for notice and
comment”); California v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 277 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1121 (N.D. Cal. 2017)
(holding that the “Postponement Notice” issued without notice and comment procedures “was
improper”); see also Buzbee, supra note 10, at 1413 n.327 (listing court “rejections of deregulatory
actions” involving procedural shortcuts).
73
See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wheeler, 899 F.3d 814, 829 (9th Cir. 2018)
(remanding matter “to the EPA with directions to revoke all tolerances [for the pesticide] chlorpyrifos,”
after the EPA acted “against its own scientific findings”), reh’g en banc granted, 914 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir.
2019) (mem.) (indicating that “three-judge panel disposition in this case shall not be cited as precedent
by or to any court of the Ninth Circuit”). Before the en banc panel could decide whether the court had
subject matter jurisdiction over the EPA’s arguably non-final order, the EPA issued a subsequent order
finalizing its determination, and the matter was referred back to the original three-judge panel. League
of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wheeler, 940 F.3d 1126, 1127 (9th Cir. 2019).
74
The Ninth Circuit invalidated the Administration’s rescission of DACA on these grounds. See
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 510 (9th Cir. 2018) (“The
rescission of DACA—based as it was solely on a misconceived view of the law—is reviewable, and
plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim that it must be set aside under the APA.”), cert. granted sub
nom., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 139 S. Ct. 2779 (2019).
75
U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 277 F. Supp. 3d at 1122; see also Air All. Hous. v. EPA, 906 F.3d
1049, 1067–69 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (holding the EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it failed to
adequately explain its delay of the Chemical Disaster Rule by dismissing safety benefits as “speculative”
and omitting discussion of factual findings related to harm the rule would prevent).
76
U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 277 F. Supp. 3d at 1121.
77
LEWIS, supra note 50, at 92, 115 (noting that new agency staff lacked “credentials” and displayed
a “seeming commitment to scientific ignorance”).
78
See supra notes 1–2.
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jurisdictional rules under the Clean Water Act—manifested an intention to
impose swift regulatory rollbacks with minimal analysis. For both of these
proposed repeals, the agencies’ opening notices outlined a bifurcated
process in which the initial decision to rescind a rule would precede a
promised rulemaking addressing the merits of substantive policy
questions.79 These opening notices were only eleven to fifteen pages long,
focused exclusively on the immediate rescission of the existing rules, and
expressly invoked the authority of Executive Orders calling for regulatory
rollbacks.80 The notices also emphasized the relevant agencies’ discretion to
alter policies based on a “change in administrations” under either Chevron81
or a recent District of Columbia Circuit opinion that relied on Justice
Rehnquist’s partial dissent in State Farm.82 Final decisions on these
proposed rollbacks have only recently been issued.83 As some early efforts
to delay existing regulations face judicial review, however, it is clear that
even agencies employing notice-and-comment procedures have sometimes
taken shortcuts, skipping over inconvenient scientific or economic data to
achieve politically chosen ends.
These shortcuts have plagued the Administration’s leading deregulatory
initiatives, including the EPA’s rule delaying the Obama Administration’s
2015 interpretation of the Clean Water Act in its “Waters of the United
States” Rule (2015 Rule). The Clean Water Act, which is intended to restore
and maintain “the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation’s waters,”84 requires the EPA Administrator to work with relevant
state and federal agencies to regulate water pollution and set “criteria for
water quality accurately reflecting the latest scientific knowledge” on “all
identifiable” health and welfare effects.85 The scope of the relevant federal
agencies’ authority to address water quality and pollution under the Clean
79

Definition of “Waters of the United States”— Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules, 82 Fed. Reg.
34,899, 34,901 (proposed July 27, 2017) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328) (proposing to repeal Clean
Water Act rule as “the first step in a two-step response to the Executive Order” that reserved “substantive
review” for a “second step” in the process); Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing
Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035, 48,038 (proposed Oct. 16,
2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (noting that the Agency “does not solicit comment” on a
replacement for the Clean Power Plan); Buzbee, supra note 10, at 1388 (noting that the Administration’s
“initial wave of actions engaged minimally with previous agency reasoning justifying the preceding
actions, . . . provided scant information on environmental effects, and divided their regulatory steps”).
80
Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules, 82 Fed. Reg.
at 34,901; Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines, 82 Fed. Reg. at 48,037.
81
Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines, 82 Fed. Reg. at 48,039.
82
Definition of the “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules, 82 Fed.
Reg. at 34,901 (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. EPA, 682 F.3d 1032, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 2012)).
83
See Revisions to Emission Guidelines Implementing Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520 (July 8,
2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60); Definition of ‘‘Waters of the United States’’—Recodification
of Pre-Existing Rules, 84 Fed. Reg. 56,626 (Oct. 22, 2019).
84
33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012).
85
Id. § 1314(a)(1).
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Water Act has long been unclear, and in 2006 a divided Supreme Court was
unable to resolve the proper scope of federal jurisdiction over the pollution
of tributaries and wetlands having some connection to “navigable waters.”86
Seeking to provide needed clarity, the 2015 Rule relied on relevant “legal
precedent,” “the best available peer-reviewed science,” and “the agencies’
technical expertise and extensive experience in implementing the CWA over
the past four decades.”87
President Trump issued an Executive Order targeting the 2015 Rule
shortly after taking office. The Order urged the EPA and the Army Corps of
Engineers to review the 2015 Rule to ensure that the goals of “promoting
economic growth” and “minimizing regulatory uncertainty” were
considered in addition to concerns about water pollution.88 President Trump
directed the agency heads to “publish for notice and comment a proposed
rule rescinding or revising” the 2015 Rule “as appropriate and consistent
with law.”89 As William Buzbee has noted, the Order “went further” than an
attempt to “tilt the agencies” against regulation;90 it attempted to direct the
substantive outcome by ordering the “agencies to ‘consider interpreting the’
underlying statutory language ‘in a manner consistent with the opinion of
Justice Antonin Scalia’ in Rapanos v. United States.”91
The EPA and Army Corps of Engineers followed the President’s
direction and initiated rulemaking proceedings to reconsider the merits of
the 2015 Rule.92 The agencies’ initial March and July 2017 notices appeared
to comply with the President’s directive, but failed to “grapple[] with . . .
past science” or to “proffer any analysis of the environmental impacts of
dropping the Clean Water Rule.”93 In addition, while those merits
proceedings were ongoing, the agencies used notice-and-comment
procedures to promulgate a separate rule delaying the 2015 Rule’s
applicability date (Delay Rule). The Delay Rule suggested that the agencies
had already decided to reject the 2015 Rule on the merits, as it delayed the
“applicability date” of the 2015 Rule until February 6, 2020.94
The agencies emphasized that their Delay Rule was “separate” from the
rulemaking proceeding designed to “revise” the “definition of ‘waters of the
86

Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 723 (2006) (plurality opinion); id. at 759 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
87
Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054, 37,055
(June 29, 2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328).
88
Exec. Order No. 13,778, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,497, § 1 (Feb. 28, 2017).
89
Id. § 2.
90
Buzbee, supra note 10, at 1383.
91
Id. (quoting Exec. Order No. 13,778, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,497, § 1 (Feb. 28, 2017)).
92
Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Preexisting Rule, 83 Fed. Reg.
32,227 (proposed July 12, 2018) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328).
93
Buzbee, supra note 10, at 1384.
94
Definition of “Water of the United States”—Addition of an Applicability Date to 2015 Clean
Water Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 5200, 5200 (Jan. 31, 2018) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328).
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United States,’” and that its purpose was to maintain the “status quo.” But
they also acknowledged that the immediate effect of the Delay Rule was to
return the law to that which existed before the 2015 Rule was promulgated:
the EPA and Army Corps will administer the “scope of CWA jurisdiction .
. . exactly . . . as it was administered prior to the promulgation of the 2015
Rule.”96 When implementing this suspension of the governing regulatory
regime, the agencies made no attempt “to address . . . the scientific record
supporting the 2015 Rule.”97 Instead, the analysis underlying the Delay Rule
omits any analysis of this scientific and economic information, cites the
Executive Order calling for agencies to “minimiz[e] regulatory uncertainty”
in their review of the 2015 Rule,98 and focuses on an immediate need for
“clarity, certainty, and consistency” in the law.99
Environmental groups challenged the Delay Rule as arbitrary and
capricious in South Carolina Coastal Conservation League v. Pruitt,100 and,
in August 2018, the district court held that the agencies’ refusal to “consider
the merits of the [2015] rule” was arbitrary and capricious and lacked the
“reasoned analysis” required by State Farm.101 The court determined that the
agencies’ truncated notice-and-comment process showed a failure to
consider the merits of the 2015 Rule before suspending it. The court
explained that the 2015 Rule “received over one million comments” over a
200-day comment period, and that the rulemaking process itself involved
“over four years of reviewing thousands of peer-reviewed scientific
studies.”102 The Delay Rule, on the other hand, “received over 680,000
public comments in the few weeks that public comment was open.”103 The
Delay Rule was “promulgated in mere months in a process that involved
instructing the public to withhold substantive comments and did not consider
any scientific studies.”104 The court found that the agencies’ refusal “to allow
public comment and consider the merits of the WOTUS rule” precluded a
“‘meaningful opportunity’ to comment.”105
The court also rejected the agencies’ stated rationale for delay, which
echoed the February 28, 2017 Executive Order’s call to minimize regulatory
uncertainty. The agencies asserted “that the WOTUS rule has been ensnared
95

Id. at 5200–01.
Id. at 5202 (emphasis added).
97
Id. at 5204 (responding to comments pointing out the EPA’s failure to address the scientific
record).
98
Id. at 5201 (citing Exec. Order No. 13,778, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,497, § 1 (Feb. 28, 2017)).
99
Id. at 5202.
100
S.C. Coastal Conservation League v. Pruitt, 318 F. Supp. 3d 959, 967 (D.S.C. 2018).
101
Id. at 967.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id. The short time period appeared to preclude meaningful review of comments or scientific
studies.
105
Id.
96
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in litigation and its suspension would reduce ‘uncertainly [sic] and
confusion’ in the regulated community [arising] from that litigation.”106 The
court rejected this argument, holding that the lack of “reasoned analysis” and
“meaningful opportunity” to comment on the merits rendered the Delay Rule
arbitrary and capricious.107 The Trump Administration’s losses in court
(perhaps coupled with new leadership at the EPA) also seem to have
prompted the agencies to supplement the scope of issues considered in the
merits docket seeking to undo the 2015 Rule.108 Not until a Supplemental
Notice issued in the summer of 2018 did the agencies offer to “delve[] in
more than a cursory manner into issues of science” raised by the 2015
Rule.109 The Administration took similar steps to supplement its analysis in
the rulemaking designed to repeal the Clean Power Plan.110
An insufficiently explained policy change also undermined the Trump
Administration’s efforts to add a citizenship question to the 2020 decennial
census. In Department of Commerce v. New York,111 the Supreme Court
found that Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross, to whom Congress has
delegated significant authority over the decennial census, did not
“adequately explain[]” his decision to add a citizenship question to the 2020
census.112 Because of that failure, the Court held that the Secretary had acted
arbitrarily and capriciously, and that the “District Court was warranted in
remanding” the issue “to the agency.”113
The Constitution requires that a decennial “enumeration” be made of the
“whole number of persons in each State,”114 and the Census Bureau conducts
the census through written questionnaires delivered to every known housing
106

Id.
Id. at 967–68 (imposing a nationwide injunction against enforcement of the Delay Rule).
108
Buzbee, supra note 10, at 1424 (noting that the agencies’ response to “judicial rejections” may
be “reflected in the EPA’s more substantial proposals published in late 2018”).
109
Id. at 1385; Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Definition of “Waters of the United
States,” 83 Fed. Reg. 32,227, 32,240–44 (July 12, 2018).
110
Buzbee, supra note 10, at 1422; see, e.g., Revisions to Emission Guidelines Implementing
Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520, 32,561 (July 8, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60)
(demonstrating “Projected CO2, SO2, and NOx Electricity Sector Emission Impacts”).
111
U.S. Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019).
112
Id. at 2575.
113
Id. at 2576. The New York District Court held that Secretary Ross acted arbitrarily and
capriciously because his decision contradicted record evidence and was pretextual. Id. at 2564. By the
time the Supreme Court issued its decision, district courts overseeing parallel litigation in Maryland and
California had also found Secretary Ross’s decision arbitrary and capricious on the same grounds.
Kravitz v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 366 F. Supp. 3d 681, 744–51 (S.D. Md. 2019); California v. Ross,
358 F. Supp. 3d 965, 1040–44 (N.D. Cal. 2019). On July 16, 2019, the Trump Administration “agreed to
a court order that will formally block it from asking about citizenship on the 2020 Census.” Bob Von
Voris, Trump Administration Agrees to Order Ending Census Fight, BLOOMBERG L. (July 16, 2019),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/trump-administration-agrees-to-final-order-endingcensus-fight.
114
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; id. amend. XIV, § 2.
107
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unit. When households do not respond to the questionnaires, the Bureau
must incur additional costs and resort to less accurate measures and
extrapolated data.116 Historically, census questionnaires have included
questions about the people to be counted as well as their number.117
Citizenship questions appeared on early questionnaires, but have not been
universally distributed for over fifty years.118
Secretary Ross’s decision to reinstate a citizenship question was not
required by a presidential executive order and was tainted by procedural
irregularities. These irregularities were not obvious on the face of the
Secretary’s March 2018 memo in which he publicly announced the addition
of the citizenship question. That memo explained that he “was acting at the
request of the [DOJ], which sought improved data about citizen voting-age
population for purposes of enforcing the Voting Rights Act.”119 The memo
discussed several ways to gather improved citizenship data and recited that
the Secretary weighed the option to “reinstate a citizenship question on the
decennial census” alongside the option to model citizenship data from
existing administrative records.120 According to the Secretary, he “carefully
considered” the possibility that the citizenship question would depress the
response rate, but determined that the existence of “limited empirical
evidence” prevented him from “determin[ing] definitively” that the question
would have this effect.121 He concluded that the “need for accurate
citizenship data . . . outweigh[s] fears about a potentially lower response
rate.”122
Secretary Ross’s decision to include a citizenship question was contrary
to the expert recommendation of the “Census Bureau, a statistical agency
housed within the Department of Commerce.”123 The Bureau predicted that
a citizenship question would reduce the accuracy of citizenship data in two
ways: First, approximately 500,000 noncitizens “would answer the question
falsely.”124 Second, “more than 13 million . . . people . . . would not answer
the citizenship question even if it were asked.”125 The Secretary discounted
these predictions as uncertain projections based on limited empirical
evidence. Although the Secretary could have obtained additional evidence
115

U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. at 2561; New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F.
Supp. 3d 502, 514–15 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
116
U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 521 (finding that “[Non-Response Follow-Up] data
is less accurate than self-response data”).
117
U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. at 2561.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 2562.
120
Id. at 2563.
121
Id. (quoting March 2018 memo).
122
Id.
123
Id. at 2561.
124
Id. at 2591 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
125
Id. at 2592.
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by following “the Bureau’s ordinary practice of extensively testing proposed
changes to the census questionnaire,”126 he did not do so. As the district court
noted, the testing that the Secretary decided to forego reflects standard
protocol under the Bureau’s Statistical Quality Guidelines, and it allows the
Bureau “to assess” a new “question’s impact on self-response rates” for both
general and subpopulations within the United States.127
After multiple groups sued to block the citizenship question,128 it
became clear that Secretary Ross’s 2018 memo failed to tell the whole story.
At the “DOJ’s urging,” the government supplemented the administrative
record with a new memo from the Secretary, “‘intended to provide further
background and context regarding’ his March 2018 memo”; the new memo
showed that the Secretary “had begun considering whether to add the
citizenship question in early 2017.”129 Plaintiffs argued that the new memo
“indicated that the Government had submitted an incomplete record of the
materials considered by the Secretary.”130 The district court allowed
Plaintiffs’ motions to compel the government “to complete the
administrative record” and to take “discovery outside the administrative
record.”131
The most surprising development occurred after the oral arguments
before the Supreme Court, when Plaintiffs called the Court’s attention to
“newly discovered evidence.”132 According to Plaintiffs, this new evidence
showed that “Dr. Thomas Hofeller, a longtime redistricting specialist,
played a significant role in orchestrating the addition of the citizenship
question to the 2020 Decennial Census,” with the purpose of “creat[ing] a
structural electoral advantage” for “Republicans and Non-Hispanic
Whites.”133 Hofeller’s role also suggested an undisclosed evidentiary basis
for reinstating the citizenship question. Plaintiffs recounted that Hofeller
conducted a 2015 study in which he concluded “that adding a citizenship
question to the 2020 Census” would be “‘advantageous to Republicans and
Non-Hispanic Whites’ in redistricting.”134 In addition, Plaintiffs asserted
126

Id. at 2590.
New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
128
U.S. Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2019).
129
Id. at 2564.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Letter from Dale E. Ho, Counsel, Am. Civil Liberties Union, to Hon. Scott S. Harris, Clerk of
the Court, Supreme Court of the U.S. (May 30, 2019), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/18966/101439/20190530142417722_2019.05.30%20NYIC%20Respondents%20Notice%20of%20Filing
%20--%20Final.pdf [hereinafter Letter to Clerk of the Court].
133
Id. The new evidence came to light after Hofeller died and his estranged daughter discovered
census-related materials in files on his hard drives. Michael Wines, Deceased G.O.P. Strategist’s Hard
Drives Reveal New Details on the Census Citizenship Question, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/30/us/census-citizenship-question-hofeller.html.
134
Letter to Clerk of the Court, supra note 132.
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that Hofeller orchestrated the DOJ’s request for a citizenship question, and
that “the letter that DOJ eventually sent to Commerce in December 2017 . .
. bears striking similarities to Dr. Hofeller’s 2015 study.”135
While the Court did not address this new evidence in its decision, it
broke the arbitrary and capricious standard of review inquiry into two
discrete parts regarding Secretary Ross’s explanation for his action.136 The
first was whether the Secretary’s “course of action was . . . supported by the
evidence before him,” and the second was whether “his stated rationale was
pretextual.”137 Different coalitions of Justices reached different conclusions
on the two questions. Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Kavanaugh,
Gorsuch, Thomas, and Alito, found that Secretary Ross’s decision was not
arbitrary and capricious because it had sufficient evidentiary support: “The
Secretary justifiably found the Bureau’s analysis” and recommendation
against the citizenship question “inconclusive” and reasonably “determined
that reinstating a citizenship question was worth the risk of a potentially
lower response rate.”138 Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Kagan,
Sotomayor, and Ginsburg, dissented, finding that the Secretary “failed to
consider” many “important aspect[s] of the problem.”139 In particular, the
dissent found that the Secretary erred by discounting evidence that a
citizenship question would “harm the accuracy of citizenship data”140 and
by making an “immediate decision rather than wait[ing] for testing” that
would provide further evidence on the question’s likely effects.141
On the second issue, Chief Justice Roberts found that Secretary Ross
acted arbitrarily and capriciously because the stated rationale for his decision
was pretextual. In a part of the opinion joined by Justices Breyer, Kagan,
Sotomayor, and Ginsburg, Chief Justice Roberts held that the Secretary’s
“sole stated reason” for his action—the Voting Rights Act “enforcement
rationale”—appears “to have been contrived.”142 In particular, the
Secretary’s stated rationale conflicted with evidence showing that he “was
determined to reinstate a citizenship question from the time he entered
office,” and that he “adopted the Voting Rights Act rationale late in the
135

Id.
Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh also joined the Chief Justice’s opinion holding
that the citizenship question did not violate the Enumeration Clause of the Constitution. U.S. Dep’t of
Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2576, 2596 (2019). Justice Alito wrote a separate partial dissent
arguing that Secretary Ross’s decision was an unreviewable decision “committed to agency discretion”
under APA section 701(a)(1). Id. at 2597 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
137
Id. at 2569 (majority opinion).
138
Id. at 2571.
139
Id. at 2584 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
140
U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. at 2592 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
141
Id. at 2593 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
142
Id. at 2575.
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process.” Based on the Secretary’s failure to adequately explain the true
reason for his decision, the Court affirmed the district court’s decision to
remand the matter to the Secretary.144 Justices Kavanaugh, Gorsuch, and
Thomas dissented to that part of the decision.145
In sum, the Trump Administration’s regulatory changes reflect the
President’s attempt to effectuate his campaign promises and exert strong
political control over regulatory policies. Although extreme, these efforts
align with a model of administrative decision making that accords greater
legitimacy to agency decisions when made under the direct control of an
elected President. Under the “political control” model, the primary remedy
for disheartened citizens is thought to rest in the ballot box. The Trump
Administration’s efforts at politically driven change clash, however, with
the courts’ initial applications of mandatory procedural rules and arbitrary
and capricious review. Many of the Administration’s outright refusals to
consider the merits of existing regulations are so extreme that they run afoul
of the unanimous holding of State Farm. Other judicial decisions have
rejected policies that were supported by incomplete or cursory analyses.
These decisions illustrate the importance of a competing theoretical model
in which agency decisions gain broader legitimacy and transparency from
expert analysis of relevant economic, scientific, or technological evidence.
II. THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REFLECTS
CHANGING VIEWS OF AGENCY EXPERTISE
This Article is principally concerned with administrative change. But
that topic presupposes the existence of agencies, and it also raises questions
about the nature of agencies, their proper role, and their claims to legitimacy.
Those questions, in turn, raise issues about the nature of technical and
scientific expertise and the place of such expertise in democratic
government. This Section briefly describes the history of administrative
agencies in the theory and practice of American government and the
persistent, but changing role that technical and scientific expertise has
played in it.
Most, if not all, theories of government recognize that laws are not
self-interpreting or self-executing, but require interpretation and execution.
Madison made this point well in Federalist 37:
All new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill,
and passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are
considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their
143

Id. at 2574.
Id. at 2576. Justice Thomas’s partial dissent disagreed with both the majority’s decision to
consider “materials outside” of the administrative record and its conclusion that these materials
established pretext. Id. at 2581 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
145
Id. at 2576.
144

2020]

SCIENCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE

23

meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular
discussions and adjudications. Besides the obscurity arising
from the complexity of objects, and the imperfection of the
human faculties, the medium through which the conceptions
of men are conveyed to each other adds a fresh
embarrassment.146
Like judges, public officials must routinely “liquidate” and ascertain the
meaning of laws.147 Sometimes their conclusions will be subject to judicial
review, but often the officials will have the last word.148
The Constitution speaks directly to the execution of the laws when it
charges the President with the duty to “take [c]are that the [l]aws be
faithfully executed.”149 The Constitution makes no specific provision for
executive branch offices, except for those of the President and the Vice
President, but the Founders clearly contemplated that the work of
government would require Congress to create various departments and
executive offices.150 Indeed, the Constitution specifically acknowledges that
understanding by providing that the President “may require the [o]pinion, in
writing, of the principal [o]fficer in each of the executive [d]epartments,
upon any [s]ubject relating to the [d]uties of their respective [o]ffices”151 and
by establishing appointment requirements for “officers” and “inferior
officers.”152 The First Congress immediately created several executive
departments,153 and later Congresses created additional executive

146

THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison).
Barry Sullivan, On the Borderlands of Chevron’s Empire: An Essay on Title VII, Agency
Procedures and Priorities, and the Power of Judicial Review, 62 LA. L. REV. 317, 317 (2002) (“Like
courts . . . administrators also interpret law.”).
148
For example, the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice often provides legal
advice to the executive branch, but much of that advice will never be tested in court. See H. JEFFERSON
POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE: THE MORAL DIMENSION OF JUDICIAL DECISION 134 n.2
(2008) (“Though these tasks remain vested as a formal matter in the attorney general, they are now
performed in practice almost exclusively by subordinate officials within the Justice Department, in
particular by the assistant attorney general who heads the Office of Legal Counsel.”).
149
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
150
George Washington wrote that, because of “‘[t]he impossibility that one man should be able to
perform all the great business of the State,’ the Constitution provides for executive officers to ‘assist the
supreme Magistrate in discharging the duties of his trust.’” Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting
Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 483 (2010) (quoting 30 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 334
(John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939)).
151
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
152
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
153
See GERHARD CASPER, SEPARATING POWER: ESSAYS ON THE FOUNDING PERIOD 42 (1997)
(describing the creation of executive departments); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS:
THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789–1801, at 36–41 (1997) (same).
147
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departments and agencies, charging them with specific statutory duties.155
In 1887, Congress created the Interstate Commerce Commission, which is
generally thought to mark “the first institutionalization of the regulatory
state.”156
It was generally understood that those who execute the laws, whether
positioned within the executive branch or in an independent agency, should
have some degree of relevant specialized knowledge. The Secretary of the
Treasury must understand the world of finance and banking, just as members
of the Interstate Commerce Commission could not have been effective
unless they understood the railroad industry. One difference, of course, is
that the Secretary of the Treasury reports to the President and serves at his
pleasure, while members of independent agencies like the Interstate
Commerce Commission do neither.157 From the beginning, questions were
raised about the fit of such agencies into the tripartite structure of American
constitutional government.
Institutionally, agencies raise important issues concerning the
relationship of expertise and political power in our form of government. On
the one hand, political power derives from the people and must be exercised
for their benefit by their elected representatives and agents, within the
framework established by the Constitution and laws. On the other hand,
government does not exist solely to give effect to the will of the people, but
to provide for the general welfare, which requires such things as a sound
economy, an effective national defense, clean air and water, healthful living
conditions, and the recognition of human dignity. Securing those benefits
requires technical expertise and rational, fact-based decision making.
Decisions that are based on false factual premises or faulty theories may
inure to the benefit of certain stakeholders, but they are more likely to
frustrate than further the general welfare. And many of the most important
decisions regarding the general welfare cannot be made on merely technical
154

See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION 68–69 (1988) (discussing the Bureau of Refugees,
Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, or Freedmen’s Bureau, which was established in 1865 in aid of
Reconstruction); see also JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCTION AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 36–39
(1961) (same).
155
Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,
25 (1995) (“[I]f Congress has conferred the relevant authority on an agency head,” then “the President
has no authority to make the decision himself”); see also Thomas O. Sargentich, The Administrative
Process in Crisis—The Example of Presidential Oversight of Agency Rulemaking, 6 ADMIN. L.J. 710,
716 (1993) (“[T]he agency head ultimately is to decide what to do.”).
156
See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS
OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 216 (1992). For a sampling of literature concerning the ICC, see Paul Stephen
Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of the Interstate Commerce Commission: The Tortuous Path from
Regulation to Deregulation of America’s Infrastructure, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1151, 1181 (2012); James
W. Ely, Jr., The Troubled Beginning of the Interstate Commerce Act, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1131, 1132
(2012); Bruce Wyman, The Rise of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 24 YALE L.J. 529, 532 (1915).
157
See, e.g., Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 625 (1935) (noting that the
Commission was not subject to direction by anyone in government).
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grounds. They often involve polycentric problems that necessarily involve
value judgments and allocations of scarce resources amongst competing
goods. When that is the case, the democratic deficit of agencies comes to the
fore. For that reason, and over time, American public law has been
concerned with giving effect both to the political will of the people’s
representatives and agents and to the people’s fundamental interest in having
governmental decisions made on a rational basis supported by the best
evidence available. 158 Theories that justify governance by unelected
agencies have assigned different weights to these competing concerns over
time.
The Interstate Commerce Act exemplifies one of the earliest
justifications for administrative agencies. When the Interstate Commerce
Commission was established in 1887, the prevailing view was that “the
legislature would decide all questions of policy and establish clear standards
and goals,” while “[t]he essential task of bureaucratic officials was to find
the most efficient means to implement clear, legislatively elaborated
ends.”159 In other words, the role of administration was to give concrete
effect to the will of Congress. This view of administration has been called
the “rule of law,” “delegation,” or “transmission-belt” theory.160 Ernst
Freund, an early proponent of this view, thought that the “most important
point in the development of administrative law is the reduction of
discretion.”161 Consequently, the “appropriate sphere of delegated authority
is where there are no controversial issues of policy or . . . opinion.”162 Freund
did not think that the actual delegation of authority to the Interstate
Commerce Commission was consistent with the “transmission-belt” theory:
it was “anomalous,” he thought, “to delegate powers to set reasonable rates;
in such areas, resolution of distinct issues should be incorporated in statutory
provisions.”163 His reservations were not unfounded. “[T]he subsequent
experience of railroad regulation cast severe doubt on the ability of general
158

Compare JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 1–6 (1999) (emphasizing the
importance of public participation in governance), and Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against
Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006), with Aileen Kavanagh, Participation and Judicial Review:
A Reply to Jeremy Waldron, 22 L. & PHIL. 451, 452–53 (2003) (noting that good governance is a higher
order value than mere participation in the political process).
159
HORWITZ, supra note 156, at 216.
160
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667,
1675 (1975).
161
ERNST FREUND ET AL., THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 24 (1923).
162
ERNST FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY 218 (1928); see also
FRANK J. GOODNOW, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 67–68
(1905) (distinguishing political choices amongst social ends from “scientific” or “technical”
administration); HORWITZ, supra note 156, at 224 (noting that Goodnow admired “the professional
expert whose skill, neutrality, and impartiality formed an alternative to both the demagoguery and
corruption of American democratic politics”).
163
Louis L. Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administration, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1183, 1185 (1973)
[hereinafter Jaffe (1973)].
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rules or standards to provide serious guidance for the detailed and complex
tasks involved in administrative regulation.”164 It became clear, for example,
that ratemaking simply involved “too many variables to be effectively
limited by general criteria.”165 More generally, “[t]he delegation doctrine
soon came to be regarded as too crude and formalistic to serve the function
of limiting administrative discretion. It depended on a theory of language
and legal reasoning that supposed that general propositions could actually
decide concrete cases.”166 Nonetheless, as Morton Horwitz has noted, the
“delegation [or transmission-belt] theory of administrative law” would
provide the formal basis for “legitimat[ing] the exercise of bureaucratic
power” for the next fifty years.167
Even in 1887, however, Woodrow Wilson was already championing a
different approach. Contrary to Freund’s “narrow discretion” theory, Wilson
thought that “large powers and unhampered discretion” were “the
indispensable conditions of [administrative] responsibility,” and, indeed, the
very “essence of administration.”168 By 1914, Wilson’s view seems to have
won out in practice, as Congress created the Federal Trade Commission and
gave it “a blank check . . . to eliminate unfair competition.”169 The Supreme
Court soon weighed in on such broad grants of discretion by formulating a
new non-delegation doctrine—one that simply required Congress to specify
an “intelligible principle” to guide the exercise of administrative or
executive discretion.170
By the time of the New Deal, “the scope of federal administrative
regulation [had] increased geometrically,”171 and proponents of the
administrative state were no longer justifying delegations of authority under

164

HORWITZ, supra note 156, at 216.
Id. at 223. The complexity and importance of the Interstate Commerce Commission’s work is
underscored by the care with which Presidents chose members of the Commission. As one commentator
has noted, Presidents chose commissioners “almost as carefully as they [chose] Justices of the United
States Supreme Court.” Dempsey, supra note 156, at 1181.
166
HORWITZ, supra note 156, at 223.
167
Id. at 216.
168
Jaffe (1973), supra note 163, at 1185 (quoting Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration,
2 POL. SCI . Q. 197, 213 (1887)). With the advantage of much hindsight, Jaffe found both Wilson’s and
Freund’s views unsatisfactory. Id. at 1183, 1186 (concluding that Wilson’s concept depended on an
overly broad and underdetermined concept of “‘regulating’ in the ‘public interest,’” while Freund’s view
of “a more or less insulated, nonpolitical, expert hierarchy acting pursuant to an authoritative statement
of ends and means” was “very ill-conceived”).
169
HORWITZ, supra note 156, at 216. Woodrow Wilson was the President who signed the Federal
Trade Commission Act.
170
J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (“If Congress shall lay
down . . . an intelligible principle to which the [executive] is directed to conform, [that] is not a forbidden
delegation of legislative power.”); accord Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 423–24 (1944).
171
HORWITZ, supra note 156, at 223.
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the “transmission-belt” theory. In his Storrs Lectures, James Landis
articulated a vision of administrative government much closer to Wilson’s
model of “large powers and unhampered discretion.” According to Landis,
regulation required both specialization and “a method that calls upon other
sciences to provide the norms.”174 It was agency expertise that gave
“unelected administrators legitimacy to engage in regulatory tasks[.]”175 In
“a joyous celebration of the virtues of ‘expertness,’”176 Landis argued that,
“[w]ith the rise of regulation, the need for expertness became dominant.”177
This regulatory expertise was not limited to “knowledge of the details of [the
industry’s] operation.”178 It also included accommodation of changing
conditions through the “ability to shift requirements” and “the pursuit of
energetic measures upon the appearance of an emergency.”179 Landis further
extolled the virtues of “‘practical’ judgment which is based upon all the
available considerations and which has in mind the most desirable and
pragmatic method of solving that particular problem.”180
The Supreme Court’s validation of agency expertise and independence
bolstered Landis’s view. In Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, the Court
found that:
[T]he language of the [Federal Trade Commission] act, the
legislative reports, and the general purposes of the legislation
as reflected by the debates, all combine to demonstrate the
172
Stewart, supra note 160, at 1677 (“[A]fter the delegation by New Deal Congresses of sweeping
powers to a host of new agencies under legislative directives cast in the most general terms, the broad
and novel character of agency discretion could no longer be concealed behind . . . labels [such as quasilegislative or quasi-judicial].”).
173
Louis L. Jaffe, James Landis and the Administrative Process, 78 HARV. L. REV. 319, 319–20
(1964) [hereinafter Jaffe (1964)] (“Landis . . . had served successively as a member of the Federal Trade
Commission, member of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and Chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commission . . . . [His Storrs lectures were] a celebration, a defense, and a rationalization of
the magnificent accomplishment in which he had played so brilliant a part.”). Landis also served as Dean
of Harvard Law School. Id.
174
JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 31 (1938). See also HORWITZ, supra note
156, at 214–15 (noting that Landis also criticized “the inefficiency of the judicial process” and the
“inability of judges trained in common law methods” to bring “either consistency or deep social
understanding to the task of regulation”).
175
HORWITZ, supra note 156, at 216.
176
Id.
177
LANDIS, supra note 174, at 23.
178
Id.
179
Id. at 23–24. Landis’s understanding of expertise does not reflect the contemporary view that
many policy questions cannot be decided by expertise alone. See infra text surrounding notes 368–70
(discussing Williamson’s decision-tree analysis wherein he notes that the harmful effects of certain
carcinogens found in foods may be outweighed by the benefits).
180
LANDIS, supra note 174, at 33. Landis insisted that “resort to the administrative process is not,
as some suppose, simply an extension of executive power.” Id. at 15. Instead, “the administrative differs”
because the “scope of its powers . . . presents an assemblage of rights normally exercisable by government
as a whole.” Id.
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Congressional intent to create a body of experts who shall gain
experience by length of service—a body which shall be
independent of executive authority, except in its selection, and
free to exercise its judgment without the leave or hindrance of
any other official or any department of the government.181
According to the Humphrey’s Executor Court, Congress intended for the
Commission to “act with entire impartiality”; it was “charged with the
enforcement of no policy except the policy of the law.”182 In addition, “[the
Commission’s] duties are neither political nor executive,” its members “are
called upon to exercise the trained judgment of a body of experts ‘appointed
by law and informed by experience,’” and it “should not be open to the
suspicion of partisan direction.”183 The Court concluded that the
commissioners did not serve at the pleasure of the President.184
Big businesses and their lawyers soon challenged the expertise model.
An American Bar Association committee chaired by Roscoe Pound185
sounded the alarm about “administrative absolutism”—“a highly centralized
administration . . . under complete control of the executive . . . relieved of
judicial review and making their own rules.”186 The committee thought the
administrative state was eroding ancient rights, particularly procedural
rights; displacing the courts from their proper role;187 and threatening the
rule of law itself.188 They were not entirely wrong. As Professor Horwitz has
observed, “between 1910 and 1940, the expertise justification of authority
resulted in the elimination of elaborate procedural protections in judicial
181

Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 625–26 (1935).
Id. at 624.
183
Id. at 624–25.
184
Id. at 632 (explaining that an officer could only be removed for a cause “named in the applicable
statute”).
185
Pound was one of the foremost legal scholars of the era. See ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW
AT HARVARD: A HISTORY OF IDEAS AND MEN, 1817–1967, at 236–38 (1967) (providing an overview of
Pound’s life and accomplishments).
186
Roscoe Pound, Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 63 REP. A.B.A. 331,
343 (1938). Interestingly, Pound places agencies within the “complete control of the executive,”
notwithstanding their ostensible legal independence. Pound aligned with the legalism of A.V. Dicey, who
“perceived [administrative law] as a hotbed of discretion and coercion, [which] posed a major threat to
the rule of law ideal.” HORWITZ, supra note 156, at 221.
187
As of 1938, “the Supreme Court likened agencies to legislatures for purposes of judicial review,”
applying a minimal standard akin to “rationality review.” Watts, supra note 9, at 15 (citations omitted);
see also RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 81 (2d ed. 2008) (“[A]n agency need[s] no
evidence, no record, and no statement of reasons to support a rule.”).
188
That view was also popular among classical liberal economists, such as Friedrich Hayek, who
characterized the rule of law in formalist terms, as “mean[ing] that government in all its actions is bound
by rules fixed and announced beforehand—rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty
how the authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan one’s individual affairs
on the basis of this knowledge.” FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72 (1944) (citation
omitted).
182
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proceedings.”
As procedures were simplified, the elite bar not only
perceived a threat to the interests of their wealthy business clients, who were
often at odds with New Deal policies, but also feared their own possible
redundancy.190 As one recent commentator has noted, “[p]rimarily, politics
motivated the reform attempts, not scientific truth. The battle over
administrative reform was a fight for the life of the New Deal . . . .”191 Much
more was at stake, however, than the frustrations and self-interest of elite
lawyers and their wealthy clients. Also at play was “[a] declining faith in the
ability of experts to produce scientific, neutral, and apolitical solutions to
social and legal questions.”192
The Pound Committee’s 1938 Report was only the opening salvo in the
war against expert agencies. In December 1940, Congress attempted to place
substantial limits on agency power when it passed the Walter-Logan Bill,
which President Roosevelt promptly vetoed.193 During this time, “disputes
over questions of administrative law became thoroughly intertwined with
raging political struggles over the legitimacy of the regulatory state.”194 The
ultimate passage of the APA in 1946 reflected a truce that accommodated
Pound’s legalist mentality as well as “the dialectical relationship between
expertise theory and proceduralism in twentieth-century American legal
thought.”195 In other words, the APA recognized the importance of expertise,
but also provided procedures to discipline agency action.
Among other things, the APA introduced notice-and-comment
rulemaking, which K.C. Davis thought was one of the greatest inventions of
modern government.196 Although the APA required that rules include a
189

HORWITZ, supra note 156, at 233.
See George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from
New Deal Politics, 90 NW. L. REV. 1557, 1572 (1996) (“Lawyers feared that they had value only in the
calm order of the courtroom . . . .”). When President Roosevelt vetoed the Walter-Logan Bill in December
1940, he called out both the legal establishment and big business for their self-interest. Id. at 1625–26.
191
Id. at 1595.
192
HORWITZ, supra note 156, at 233.
193
President Roosevelt pointed out that the bill would have forced administrative agencies “into a
single mold which is so rigid, so needlessly interfering, as to bring about a widespread crippling of the
administrative process.” PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., PROVIDING FOR THE EXPEDITIOUS SETTLEMENT OF
DISPUTES WITH THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 986, at 4 (1940). In addition, “[w]herever a
continuing series of controversies exist between a powerful and concentrated interest on one side and a
diversified mass of individuals, each of whose separate interests may be small, on the other side, the only
means of obtaining equality before the law has been to place the controversy in an administrative
tribunal.” Id. at 3. Congress was unable to override the veto. Shepherd, supra note 190, at 1630.
194
HORWITZ, supra note 156, at 231.
195
Id. at 233. Walter Gellhorn, who participated in these events, has observed that, “what was
forestalled was more significant than what was enacted.” Walter Gellhorn, The Administrative Procedure
Act: The Beginnings, 72 V A . L. REV . 219, 232 (1986).
196
See K ENNETH CULP D AVIS, A DMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE SEVENTIES, at ix, xvii (1976)
(noting that even when the APA did not require a notice and comment procedure, the common law may
have done so, and praising “judge-made administrative law”); Kagan, supra note 6, at 2262 (remarking
that the APA was intended to “curtail[] the sway of administrative officials by subjecting . . . rulemakings
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“concise . . . statement of . . . basis and purpose,” “thereby providing
courts with a basis for striking down agency rules as arbitrary or capricious
under section 706(2)(A) of the APA,” agencies continued to receive an
“extraordinary level of deference.”198 As late as 1958, the procedural
demands on rulemaking were “not great,” reflecting an understanding that
“agency action was ‘expert’” and somewhat “remove[d] from politics.”199
In the 1960s and 1970s, concerns about “agency capture” brought the
agency expertise model into question once more.200 Even Landis began to
express doubts,201 and Louis Jaffe offered a sober response to Landis’s
previously exuberant defense of the New Deal. First, Jaffe recounted the
New Deal’s “paradigm of broad delegation” in which agencies derived
legitimacy from an “assumed comprehensive body of expertise . . . informed
by the values of the New Deal.”202 Jaffe then noted, ironically, that, “[a]s
long as New Dealers were in control and . . . public opinion supported them,
the new agencies performed very well as judged by those who created
them.”203 He concluded by noting that the failures of existing agencies had
made them prey to “agency capture”—a theory positing that agencies
become the “captives” of the industries they are charged with regulating.204
and (especially) adjudications — to stringent procedural requirements”); Harold Leventhal, Review:
Administrative Law of the Seventies, 44 U. CHI . L. REV . 260, 264 (1976) (rulemaking is “extremely
useful” and typically preferable “to adjudicatory trial-type procedures”).
197
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1970).
198
Watts, supra note 9, at 15 (citation omitted).
199
Peter L. Strauss, From Expertise to Politics: The Transformation of American Rulemaking, 31
WAKE FOREST L. REV . 745, 752–53 (1996) (“[T]he new APA procedures for legislative rulemaking,
although apparently undemanding and so intended at the time, enlarged both agency responsibilities and
possibilities of judicial control.” (footnote omitted)); Watts, supra note 9, at 15 (“After the APA was
enacted in 1946, things did not change much.”).
200
See Wagner (2015), supra note 16, at 2025 (“During that time, Congress found itself dependent
on the agencies to set standards . . . implementing the new wave of social legislation. Unfortunately, this
increased responsibility coincided with worries that, in their exercise of technical discretion, some
agencies had been ‘captured’ by the parties they regulated . . . .”).
201
See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES
TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 1–2 (Comm. Print 1960) (submitted by James M. Landis, who expressed his
concerns about the “expansion of the role, power and duties of the agencies”); see also Jaffe (1964),
supra note 173, at 322 (explaining that “planning the regulation of an industry” is not the same as
“planning the policies of an industry”); Louis L. Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process:
A Reevaluation, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1107 (1954) [hereinafter Jaffe (1954)] (suggesting the need for
reevaluating the administrative process); Stewart, supra note 160, at 1686 (explaining Landis’s change
of heart).
202
Jaffe (1973), supra note 163, at 1187 (noting that Landis’s model may have shared some
similarities with “the Weberian model of a bureaucracy thoroughly motored and controlled by rational
elaboration,” but the Landis model, unlike Weber’s, did not derive “content and authority” from
“legislative” dictates).
203
Id.
204
Id. at 1187. Nonetheless, Jaffe saw some danger in overstating the importance of agency capture,
as the theory “grossly exaggerat[es] the germ of truth which it does indeed embody” and excludes other
“significant inputs” from bureaucracy including “expertness.” Id. at 1187–88.
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This concern illuminated the weaknesses of Landis’s model of agencies
immune from any influence except for expert knowledge:
[T]he Landis model, if taken as a generalization for all
administrative agencies at all times, makes certain untenable
assumptions: the existence in each case of relevant, value-free
concepts, and an administration located at any given moment
of time outside the political process . . . or insulated from the
power structure.205
Jaffe’s extended reconsideration of Landis’s “broad delegation” model
not only came in the midst of debates about agency capture, but also at a
time of renewed concern about broad agency discretion and the effectiveness
of various mechanisms for combatting it. It was widely recognized that
discretion was necessary to give proper scope to the exercise of expert
judgment, but it was also understood that limits were necessary if the basic
values of representative government and the rule of law were to be respected.
“[T]he prevalent ‘expertise-based’ model of agency decisionmaking,
view[ing] agencies as professional, apolitical experts charged with pursuing
the public interest, began to fade away.”206 As that happened, the courts
perceived the need to guard against capture by ensuring broader public
participation and a more muscular form of judicial review—one aimed at
ensuring that agencies faithfully exercised the discretion that Congress had
granted to them.207 As Kathryn Watts has explained:
[V]arious prominent judges on the D.C. Circuit crafted a
ramped up version of “arbitrary and capricious” review—
called “hard look” review—that enabled courts to scrutinize
agency decisions and to ensure that the public interest was
being served. . . . Applying this more stringent level of review,
courts began to scrutinize the substantive elements of agency
decisions to ensure that agencies gave adequate consideration
to the relevant data and gave reasoned explanations to support
their decisions.208
Courts and scholars struggled to find ways to limit agency discretion and
ensure agency legitimacy. In addition to substantive review, the courts began
to impose additional procedural requirements designed to test whether an
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Id. at 1187.
Watts, supra note 9, at 15–16 (alteration in original).
207
See A LFRED C. A MAN , J R ., A DMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A G LOBAL ERA 33–35 (1992)
(explaining that reasoned decision making requirements of hard-look review were an “important source
of . . . legitimacy and a demonstration that [the agency] was a responsible agent of Congress”).
208
Watts, supra note 9, at 16.
206
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agency had actually done the work that Congress had required it to do.209
These additional rulemaking requirements included directives that agencies
disclose the significant relevant data in their possession; that they submit
draft rules for a second round of comment if significant changes were made;
and that they provide statements of basis and purpose that addressed all
significant comments and disclosed in some detail the agency’s reasoning.210
Although the Supreme Court ultimately held, in Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., that the courts had
no authority to impose procedural requirements in addition to those
prescribed by the APA and other relevant statutes,211 the remaining
substantive requirements of “hard look review” still “exact[ed] a price.”
“‘[P]aper hearings’ generated mammoth records and ‘concise general
statement[s] of basis and purpose’ expanded into the hundreds of pages to
meet the demands of ‘hard look review.’ As a result, rulemaking became
more and more expensive to complete . . . .”212
In addition, the sheer cost of participation in such potentially expensive
rulemaking proceedings undercut the possibility of broad public
participation.213 Without regard to whether wealthy business interests could
actually “capture” an agency, it was clear that their well-financed voices
could at least drown out all but their most well-resourced opponents. The
courts no longer imposed additional rulemaking procedures, but the
Supreme Court embraced hard look review in State Farm in 1983.214 State
Farm’s “burden of explanation” demands that agencies disclose their
reasoning with greater transparency than did past conceptions of judicial
review.215
Some scholars, including Louis Jaffe, thought that the solution to
excessive agency discretion was for Congress to legislate with greater
specificity. To show that Congress was capable of doing so, Jaffe pointed to
209

AMAN, supra note 207, at 34–35 (imposing a higher standard of review upon agencies,
“requiring that agencies explain the links between the congressionally expressed belief in progress and
the reasonableness of the regulation being reviewed”).
210
Strauss, supra note 199, at 756–57.
211
Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524–25 (1978).
212
See Strauss, supra note 199, at 760. Kenneth Culp Davis and Judge Henry J. Friendly
championed an alternative requirement that agencies promulgate rules to narrow their statutory
discretion. Jaffe (1973), supra note 163, at 1190; see also notes 35–36 and accompanying text (discussing
State Farm and the definitions of “arbitrary” and “capricious”). The Supreme Court rejected this solution
in Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 486 (2001).
213
See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 160, at 1712 (“The viability in practice of such a pluralist theory
of legitimacy is challenged at the outset by the predominant contemporary critique of the administrative
process: that agencies are biased in favor of regulated and client groups, and are generally unresponsive
to unorganized interests.” (footnote omitted)).
214
Seidenfeld, supra note 10, at 153–54.
215
Id. at 155 (noting that new demands of review required that an agency justify its decisions by
addressing factors relevant to its decision).
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216

the “monumental detail of the tax code.” But Jaffe failed to recognize that
the limited resources available to Congress made “monumental detail”
unattainable in more than a few areas. In addition, some regulatory problems
may be more scientifically or technically complex and dynamic than tax
policy, and Congress may lack the ability to legislate with the expertise and
frequency required for “monumental detail” in those areas.217 In any event,
Congress made no effort to take up Jaffe’s invitation.218
If tax policy once represented the zenith of technical complexity in
government regulation, it was soon displaced by the health and safety
legislation of the 1960s and 1970s. Administering this legislation presented
even more difficult questions of science and technology, as well as equally
difficult questions of public policy and resource allocation. These issues
were controversial because of the huge private costs associated with the
alleviation of risks, the scientific uncertainty and difficulty of quantifying
the precise benefits that might flow from various regulatory approaches, and
the fact that resolutions of these questions were necessarily provisional and
might be rendered obsolete by future advances in knowledge.219 Congress
lacked the kind of in-house expertise necessary to address the myriad
scientific, technical, and economic fields implicated by this new generation
of regulatory statutes.220 Nor could Congress monitor the rapid and frequent
changes in relevant scientific knowledge, let alone amend legislation quickly
enough to address these changes in an effective way. To accomplish
Congress’s objectives, a broad delegation of authority seemed necessary.
Thus, for example, the Occupational Safety and Health Act directed the
Secretary of Labor to adopt regulations that would ensure, to the extent
feasible, that exposure to hazards in the workplace does not harm workers’

216

Jaffe (1973), supra note 163, at 1189–90 (“The monumental detail of the tax code suggests that
Congress can, and does, legislate with great specificity when it regards a matter as sufficiently
important.”).
217
When Jaffe was writing in 1973, the seniority system was still largely entrenched in Congress,
and committee members, especially chairs and ranking members, often had substantial expertise in the
substantive policy areas within their jurisdictions. See George Goodwin, Jr., The Seniority System in
Congress, 53 A M . POL. SCI . REV . 412, 412 (1959).
218
See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS, 95TH CONG., STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION
6–7, 67–81 (Comm. Print 1977) (considering but rejecting arguments for greater executive control over
independent administrative agencies).
219
See Doremus, supra note 16, at 450 (discussing the additional regulatory changes Congress
should make).
220
See Jathan Sadowski, The Much-Needed and Sane Congressional Office that Gingrich Killed
Off
and
We
Need
Back,
A TLANTIC
(Oct.
26,
2012),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/10/the-much-needed-and-sane-congressionaloffice-that-gingrich-killed-off-and-we-need-back/264160/ (discussing the elimination of Congress’s
Office of Technology Management).
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health. Other statutes contained similarly broad mandates, which posed
new problems for those concerned with broad delegations of authority to
administrative agencies.
Ironically, just as new agencies began to implement the broad mandates
contained in this new generation of regulatory statutes,223 Congress and the
President started to undo earlier regulatory schemes, including the Interstate
Commerce Act and the Civilian Aviation Act.224 The push for deregulation
came from scholars as well as influential business leaders who preferred not
having to do business under the eyes of regulators. They found a receptive
audience in the White House.225 For some, that push reflected a widely
shared view that economic regulation of transportation industries no longer
worked.226 For others, however, the push was part of a more fundamental
shift and the emergence of a new set of federal regulatory principles: that
free market principles should usually prevail over regulation; that regulation
should generally be disfavored as an improper interference with the market;
that proponents of regulation should carry the burden of demonstrating the
need for regulation; and that the ultimate questions of whether to regulate,
how much to regulate, and the form that the regulation should take require a
careful evaluation of costs and benefits.227 In a broader sense, the
221

29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1988).
See, e.g., Wagner (1995), supra note 25, at 1618 n.15 (“Science-based regulations are typically
based on a vague statutory mandate that requires the agency to set standards or take action at the point at
which a chemical substance presents or will present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the
environment.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
223
See, e.g., Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 490 (1981) (OSHA cotton dust
standard); Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 625–26 (1980) (OSHA benzene
standard); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (OSHA lead
standard); Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (EPA lead ambient air
standard).
224
Deregulation began in earnest with President Carter’s deregulation of the trucking and airline
industries and accelerated under President Reagan.
225
See AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON LAW & ECON., FEDERAL REGULATION: ROADS TO REFORM
79–80 (1979) (calling for greater presidential oversight to avoid duplication and decrease regulatory
costs); Lloyd N. Cutler & David R. Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84 YALE L.J. 1395,
1399, 1409, 1417 (1975) (advocating for presidential intervention and oversight of agencies).
226
See Cutler & Johnson, supra note 225, at 1396 n.4 (1975) (noting that the “Council of Economic
Advisors’ Annual Report suggested that the deregulation of transportation might have to be considered
‘a matter of urgent national priority’”).
227
Cost-benefit analysis had long been a prominent feature in other areas of law. See EDWARD M.
GRAMLICH, A GUIDE TO BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 2, 3 (2d ed. 1990) (noting the use of cost-benefit
analysis by many Presidents and in a variety of different areas of regulation). Its use in regulation has
been extensively documented by Cass Sunstein. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF
GOVERNMENT 167–68 (2013) (providing examples of the government’s use of cost-benefit analysis in
enacting new regulations); Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths
and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1858 (2013) (explaining that “[i]n popular and academic
discussions of the OIRA process, a great deal of attention is devoted to cost-benefit analysis” (footnote
omitted)); Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Information, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1349, 1364 (2011)
(noting that the problem with the current system is that most regulations are only subject to cost-benefit
222
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requirement that regulations be justified in terms of their respective costs
and benefits would provide another means by which to limit broad statutory
grants of discretion to agencies. Indeed, by the late 1970s, some proponents
of cost-benefit analysis argued that this analysis should be treated as an
implied term in federal regulatory statutes.228 This move toward
quantification would also call into question the individual agencies’
resolution of regulatory matters and embellish the credentials of a competing
decisionmaker: the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). As a separate
entity within the Executive Office of the President (EOP), the OMB had
special expertise in cost-benefit analysis and provided a means for
subjecting agencies to more centralized presidential control.229
The drive for presidential control of agency policymaking has been the
most important development in administrative law in recent decades. 230 In
1996, Peter Strauss noted that, “the Carter, Reagan, and Bush
administrations were characterized by increasingly stringent efforts to gain
presidential control over rulemaking in the agencies.”231 More recently, in
2010, Strauss wrote that, “[t]he development of aggressively centralized
presidential oversight, even control, of executive agency rulemaking has
given . . . new prominence” to the clash between technocratic and political
views of agency action.232 Thus, at the same time that recent Presidents have
issued executive orders requiring agencies to engage in cost-benefit analysis,
analysis before they are implemented). But see RICCARDO REBONATO, TAKING LIBERTIES: A CRITICAL
EXAMINATION OF LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM 1, 2 (2012) (offering libertarian paternalism as a “Third
Way”).
228
See, e.g., Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 639 (1980)
(rejecting the view of “industry representatives” that Congress’s use of the terms “reasonably necessary”
and “feasible” in the Occupational Safety and Health Act to describe required safety standards should be
disregarded or reinterpreted to require “the Agency to quantify both the costs and the benefits of a
proposed rule”).
229
See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981) (President Reagan required
executive agencies to submit cost-benefit analyses of major rule proposals to the OMB); Exec. Order No.
12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993) (President Clinton imposed similar cost-benefit
requirements). Alternatively, then-Judge Stephen Breyer proposed the creation of an elite cadre of
administrators, much like that envisioned by James Landis, who would be responsible for ordering
administrative policy around rational cost-benefit analyses. See STEPHEN BREYER , BREAKING THE
V ICIOUS CIRCLE : TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 61–62 (1993) (suggesting the
implementation of a “specific kind of group” and explaining why it would be successful); see also Barry
Sullivan, Democracy, Bureaucracy, and Science: Making the Trains Run on Time, 89 NW. U. L. REV.
166 (1994) (reviewing Breyer’s book).
230
See, e.g., Robert V. Percival, Who’s in Charge? Does the President Have Directive Authority
over Agency Regulatory Decisions?, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2487, 2487 (2011) (discussing how many
Presidents advocated for regulatory review); see Robert V. Percival, Checks without Balance: Executive
Office Oversight of the Environmental Protection Agency, 54 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 128–29 (1991)
(“White House concern over the potential impact of [certain] regulations on industry stimulated the
creation of the regulatory review programs.”).
231
Strauss, supra note 199, at 760.
232
Peter L. Strauss, Legislation that Isn’t—Attending to Rulemaking’s “Democracy Deficit”, 98
CALIF. L. REV. 1351, 1359 (2010).
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presumably putting rulemaking on a firmer analytical basis, the same
Presidents have increasingly sought to insert their own policy views, usually
through OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), into
specific rulemaking proceedings. The two moves may be consistent, from
the viewpoint of maximizing executive power, but they seem inconsistent at
another level because of the conflict between the “expertise” and “political”
models of decision making.
From the very beginning, the Trump Administration has been
particularly aggressive both in asserting centralized control over agency
decision making and in insisting that science take second seat to politics.233
But the principal theorist for this view of presidential control of
administrative action was then-Professor Elena Kagan. Following her time
in the Clinton White House, Kagan wrote a lengthy justification for
President Clinton’s control of administrative policy.234 In Presidential
Administration, Kagan provides an account of the history of the American
administrative state as “[t]he history of competition among different entities
for control of its policies.”235 She writes:
All three branches of government—the President, Congress,
and the Judiciary—have participated in this competition; so
too have the external constituencies and internal staffs of the
agencies. Because of the stakes of the contest and the strength
of the claims and the weapons possessed by the contestants,
no single entity has emerged finally triumphant, or is ever
likely to do so. But at different times, one or another has come
to the fore and asserted at least a comparative primacy in
setting the direction and influencing the outcome of
administrative process. In this time, that institution is the
Presidency.236
Kagan notes that President Nixon sought to control a hostile bureaucracy
“by creating a ‘counter-bureaucracy’ within the EOP, with a White House
staff more than double the size of Lyndon Johnson’s, a new White Housecentered Domestic Council to formulate policy positions on domestic issues,
and an expansive OMB,”237 but that “[t]he sea change began with Ronald

233

See supra Part I (discussing the Trump Administration’s regulatory changes).
See Kagan, supra note 6, at 2246 (providing an overview of Kagan’s article justifying President
Clinton’s control of administrative policy).
235
Id.
236
Id. Kagan further notes that, “[e]ach kind of administrative control that this account highlights—
congressional control (through bureaucratic experts), and interest group control—achieved its heyday at
roughly the appointed time, but each also survives in some form today, well past its purported demise.”
Id. at 2254.
237
Id. at 2276.
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238

Reagan’s inauguration.” In the first month of his administration, President
Reagan issued Executive Order 12,291, which “effectively gave OMB a
form of substantive control over rulemaking: under the order, OMB had
authority to determine the adequacy of an impact analysis and to prevent
publication of a proposed or final rule, even indefinitely, until the
completion of the review process.”239 The centralization of administration
continued under President George H.W. Bush and reached its zenith under
President Clinton.240 Kagan writes:
President Clinton treated the sphere of regulation as his own,
and . . . made it his own, in a way no other modern President
had done. Clinton came to view administration as perhaps the
single most critical—in part because the single most
available—vehicle to achieve his domestic policy goals. He
accordingly developed a set of practices that enhanced his
ability to influence or even dictate the content of
administrative initiatives. He exercised this power with respect
to . . . rulemakings, more informal means of policymaking, and
even certain enforcement activities.241
Indeed, Clinton went far beyond Reagan in his assertions of authority to
direct administrative policy. As Kagan notes, “Presidents before Reagan . .
. usually had shunned direct EOP involvement in any administrative
rulemaking, and even Reagan, in creating a mechanism for this involvement,
had disclaimed any authority ultimately to displace the judgment of agency
officials.”242 Clinton, on the other hand, “implied precisely this power—
presidential directive authority over discretionary decisions assigned by
Congress to specified executive branch officials (other than the
President).”243 The agencies “were his and so too were their decisions.”244
Kagan acknowledges that Congress may grant discretionary authority to
agency officials alone and that the President must respect the limits of such
238

Id. at 2277.
Id. at 2278. Kagan also notes that “the order and the legal opinion supporting it explicitly
disclaimed any right on the part of OMB, or the President himself, to dictate or displace agency
decisions.” Id. That might have been true in theory, but the power granted to OMB suggested a different
reality. In addition to “the delay created by OMB review,” critics were concerned about delay as well as
“the secrecy with which President Reagan’s regulatory oversight system operated.” Id. at 2280
(observing that “[m]ost of OMB’s communications with the agencies . . . never appeared in the public
record”).
240
See id. at 2344 (noting that “[b]oth Reagan and Clinton used their methods of administrative
control to drive a resistant bureaucracy and political system.” (emphasis added)). The “resistant” political
system apparently refers to Congress. Id.
241
Id. at 2281–82 (footnote omitted).
242
Id. at 2289–90 (footnote omitted).
243
Id. at 2290.
244
Id.
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delegations, but she also argues that Congress seldom specifically precludes
the President from directing the official to whom Congress has delegated the
discretion.245 Thus, “most statutes granting discretion to executive branch—
but not independent—agency officials should be read as leaving ultimate
decisionmaking authority in the hands of the President.”246 Kagan’s
controversial interpretive principle seemingly aligns with the Supreme
Court’s decision in Chevron, which endorsed the EPA’s reliance “upon the
[Reagan] administration’s views of wise policy” in granting deference to the
EPA’s changed interpretation of the Clean Air Act.247
Kagan argues for presidential administration on two grounds:
accountability and effectiveness. With respect to the first, she argues that
presidential administration enhances transparency, “enabling the public to
comprehend more accurately the sources and nature of bureaucratic power,”
and “establishes an electoral link between the public and the bureaucracy,
increasing the latter’s responsiveness to the former.”248 Presidential
administration is also more effective. Being a unitary actor, the President
presumably “can act without the indecision and inefficiency that so often
characterize the behavior of collective entities,” and “because his
‘jurisdiction’ extends throughout the administrative state (or at least, the
executive branch), he can synchronize and apply general principles to
agency action in a way that congressional committees, special interest
groups, and bureaucratic experts cannot.”249 For Kagan, the ultimate
measure of success is effectiveness “in establishing new priorities for
agencies and in advancing a broad domestic policy agenda.”250 The
“capacity for action and reaction” is more important than “never mak[ing]
an error.”251
Kagan acknowledges that her conclusion “would be less sound to the
extent that the political and administrative systems fail to impose adequate
245

Id. at 2320.
Id. She adds: “This rule of statutory construction appropriately derives from an effort to
determine congressional intent as well as, given some uncertainty in doing so, an effort to promote good
lawmaking practices.” Id. Kagan notes that when she refers to the President, she is, of course, speaking
“of a more institutional actor—the President and his immediate policy advisors in OMB and the White
House.” Id. at 2338. Kagan does not extend this rule to independent agencies. Id. at 2327.
247
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984); Kagan, supra
note 6, at 2373 (endorsing this aspect of Chevron and encouraging a deference doctrine that supports
“presidential control over administrative action”).
248
Id. at 2331–32.
249
Id. at 2339 (footnote omitted). In this regard, Kagan relies on Alexander Hamilton’s view as to
the desirability of “energy” in the executive. See id. at 2341–43 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 402
(Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (“A feeble executive implies a feeble execution of
government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for bad execution; and a government ill executed .
. . must be, in practice, a bad government.”)).
250
See id. at 2345 (describing “Clinton’s brand of presidential administration” as “highly effective”
in this regard).
251
Id.
246
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limits on the President’s exercise of administrative power.” While she also
acknowledges the continued importance of agency expertise, she justifies
her approach by arguing that politics will not impinge on agency expertise
in many cases.253 Because “not all agency action entails the application of
expertise,” “presidential dictation of agency action” does not always
displace agency action.254 Further, Kagan argues, Presidents will often have
incentives to “encourage the application of expertise to administrative
problems.”255 In that vein, she notes President Clinton’s inclination to “steer
clear” of many environmental regulations.256
These theories of executive accountability and energy emphasize the
benefits of a unitary actor—the President. But the President obviously relies
on others to assist him in executing the laws. He may depend on political
appointees or civil servants in the various departments and agencies. Most
important, he may rely on members of the EOP, who now number about
4000, and, for the most part, are not subject to Senate confirmation or readily
amenable to congressional oversight. Although the President can familiarize
himself personally with only a relatively small number of the issues with
which the EOP deals, many staff members will purport to speak for the
President when dealing with federal agencies on issues of substantial
importance, and their views usually will carry the day, regardless of whether
they really represent positions that the President himself has actually
considered, let alone adopted.
Given the limited role that Kagan envisions for agency expertise, it is
not surprising that she ultimately urges greater latitude for agencies to
change discretionary policies for political reasons.257 Those views align well
with the Trump Administration’s assertions of power to alter policies based
on a “change in administrations” under Chevron and Justice Rehnquist’s
partial dissent in State Farm.258 Such deference to political change makes
sense only in light of the larger current of understanding that expertise no
longer justifies broad delegations to administrative agencies. If expertise has
fallen out of the larger picture of theoretical justifications for the
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Id.
Id. at 2352 (arguing that “the apparent tradeoff between politics and expertise” is “overdrawn”).
254
Id. at 2354.
255
Id.
256
Id. at 2356.
257
See infra discussion surrounding notes 503–08 (explaining Justice Kagan’s argument that
Presidents should have greater authority to influence the policies of administrative agencies).
258
See supra discussion surrounding notes 84–91 (detailing the Trump Administration’s efforts to
change existing rules, such as by repealing two major environmental regulations). As previously
explained, the Trump Administration’s complete refusals to consider the merits of certain issues are so
extreme that they violate the unanimous holding of State Farm. See supra discussion surrounding notes
100–01 (describing a district court holding that an agency’s failure to consider the merits of a repealed
rule lacked the “reasoned analysis” required by State Farm). Kagan’s argument does not question the
unanimous portion of State Farm.
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administrative state, it may also be unnecessary to continue insisting that
agencies engage in expert analysis when changing policies.
Many contemporary regulatory problems involve complicated questions
of policy and resource allocation as well as scientific or technical questions.
Science may tell us within a reasonable degree of certainty about the varying
degrees of risk that come with different levels of exposure to various toxic
substances, and science can provide an informed judgment about what levels
of risk are advisable. But science alone cannot tell us how much society
should ultimately spend to lower, from one level to another, the risk of
exposure to one toxic substance, as opposed to what we should spend to
reduce the risk of exposure to another toxic substance, from one level to
another. That, ultimately, is a normative or political question—the answer
to which can be aided by science, but not dictated by science alone. Because
of their expertise, agencies are well positioned to make judgments about
these hybrid questions of science-policy, but we expect them to do so in a
transparent way, showing candor with respect to the various elements of the
problem, the processes by which their judgments were formed, and the ways
in which their judgments may be limited.
Much is typically at stake, politically and economically, in technical and
science-intensive rules. It is not surprising, therefore, that the President,
whose perspective theoretically encompasses the fullest range of
governmental issues, should wish to have a voice in the resolution of such
issues. At the same time, it seems necessary that the political and scientific
parts of the problem should be kept separate, and the relationship between
the two should be made transparent. For example, decisions dictated by
resource allocation demands or other political choices should not be passed
off as having been dictated by science. But Wendy Wagner has identified “a
growing body of evidence reveal[ing] that the White House may regularly
(and surreptitiously) suggest change to the technical details of agency
analyses.”259 This practice can only undermine confidence in agency
expertise.260 The task for administrative law today is to accommodate the
respective claims of agency expertise and presidential power in a manner
that is transparent and also promotes rational decision making.261
Past scholarship has articulated a variety of theories aimed at
legitimating or de-legitimating the administrative state. Great battles have
been fought over those theories, and, even now, the question remains
whether any theory can satisfactorily ground administrative agencies within
the context of our constitutional system.262 Those fires erupt from time to
time, die down, and erupt again. The ultimate outcome of disputes over the
259

Wagner (2015), supra note 16, at 2022 (footnote omitted).
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261
Id.
262
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legitimacy of the administrative state remains to be seen. Fortunately, the
scope of our undertaking is more limited: to explain what values should
apply to agency changes in policy. While many scholars have found fault
with expertise as a justification for delegations of power to administrative
agencies in recent decades, the Justices have largely continued to demand
that administrative change reflect expert judgment and the consideration of
relevant scientific, technological, or economic evidence. The remainder of
this Article offers a positive procedural account of the role of expertise in
administrative change. It then explains how this understanding supports
existing requirements that agencies engage in reasoned, expert analysis
before changing policies.
III. THE SCIENCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE: A POSITIVE PROCEDURAL
ACCOUNT OF EXPERT AGENCY DECISION MAKING
A. Congress’s Delegation of Authority to Make Expert Decisions
This Article does not attempt the Herculean feat of legitimizing the
entire administrative state. Instead, this Article addresses the narrower, but
critical question of what role expertise should play when policy changes are
made. Traditional accounts align the making of agency policy changes with
currently dominant theories of political accountability and the notion of an
“energetic” executive.263 This Article takes a different tack, based on the
understanding that the accommodation of change is a fundamental aspect of
expert decision making. It then provides a positive procedural account of the
capacity of agencies to adjust policies in light of change. This account shows
that agencies are uniquely situated to fulfill congressional mandates that call
for expert decision making in changing circumstances.
To start with, regulatory statutes often call for expert analysis that is
capable of incorporating new scientific or technological knowledge.
Statutory provisions range from explicit directives to ground decisions on
particular types of scientific data to open-ended mandates that agencies must
fulfill by using their expertise.264 For example, the Endangered Species Act
requires agencies to list or delist endangered and threatened species “solely
on the basis of the best scientific and commercial data available.”265
Likewise, the Clean Water Act requires that the EPA ensure that certain
263

Kagan, supra note 6, at 2341–43. The executive’s energy may also be exercised by political
appointees who head agencies or officers or aides within the Executive Office of the President.
264
See Doremus, supra note 16, at 405–06 (describing the “best available science mandate” of the
Endangered Species Act).
265
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2012). See Doremus, supra note
16, at 418–36 (describing potential motivations for Congress’s best available science mandate); see also
42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(3)(A)(i) (2012) (detailing how, under the Safe Drinking Water Act, administrators
must use the “best available, peer-reviewed science and supporting studies conducted in accordance with
sound and objective scientific practices”).
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power plant structures implement the “best technology available for
minimizing adverse environmental impact.”266 Other statutes, such as the
Toxic Substances Control Act, advance more general, scientifically
informed goals of regulating chemicals that “present . . . an unreasonable
risk of injury to health or the environment.”267 And still other statutes such
as the Federal Reserve Act identify agency goals that require the exercise of
financial expertise. That is the case, for example, with respect to Congress’s
direction that the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Open Markets
Committee “maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates
. . . so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable
prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.”268 Even such open-ended
statutes as the Federal Trade Commission Act require the agency’s
application of economic expertise when deciding whether a particular
business practice amounts to an “unfair method of competition.”269 Of
course, agencies carrying out these various directives still have a great deal
of discretion, and promulgating new regulations in the face of scientific
uncertainty, industry resistance, or pressures from non-governmental
organizations often proves a daunting task.270 Still, when agencies choose to
expend resources on policy change under these statutes, they act pursuant to
congressional mandates, which, directly or indirectly, charge agencies with
incorporating expert analysis into their decision making processes.
Critically, the expert decisions called for by these statutory mandates
incorporate scientific or technological understandings that are premised on
the necessity and inevitability of change. As Holly Doremus has explained,
even scientific conclusions with a “fairly broad consensus” at one point in
time may later prove “wrong,” when “incorrect interpretations will be
corrected as inconsistent data accumulates.”271 Thus, “in the long run, the
scientific process produces extremely robust information about the world,”
because “tentative conclusions remain open to challenge” and always

266

33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2012). The Supreme Court held that the “best technology available”
standard allowed the EPA to factor in the costs of its regulation. Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556
U.S. 208, 226 (2009).
267
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2012). See also Occupational Safety and
Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2012) (requiring that exposure to toxins should be set at a level
“which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible . . . that no employee will suffer material
impairment of health or functional capacity”); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012) (noting that
standards for commonplace “criteria” air pollutants must “allow[] an adequate margin of safety . . .
requisite to protect the public health”).
268
12 U.S.C. § 225a (2012).
269
See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012) (delineating the scope of the Federal Trade Commission’s authority
to enforce violations of the Act).
270
See Wagner (1995), supra note 25, at 1616–17 (detailing the difficulties agencies face in
promulgating regulations in light of the “science charade”).
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Doremus, supra note 16, at 411.
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272

present “the opportunity to refine understanding.” On a similar note, Joel
Mokyr has charted the course of technological progress by comparing it to
evolution.273 He rejects a linear notion of technological progress, instead
positing that technology advances by “continuous and smooth sequences”
of incremental growth that are punctuated by “leaps and bounds” of new
inventions that lack “clear-cut parentage” and represent a “clear break from
previous technique.”274
These theories of scientific and technological change are consistent with
the dynamic that is characteristic of more discrete regulatory questions.
Annual updates to FDA-approved influenza vaccinations, for example,
reflect the fact that “[f]lu viruses are constantly changing.”275 Each year’s
new “vaccine composition” reflects updated scientific analysis based on the
receipt and “testing [of] thousands of influenza virus samples,” on the
“results of surveillance, laboratory, and clinical studies,” and on the
“availability” of suitable “vaccine viruses.”276 Another example, with
respect to evolving technology, is the Energy Department’s updated 2015
Wind Vision Report, which was produced by an “elite team of researchers,
academics, scientists, engineers, and wind industry experts,”277 who were
tasked with documenting how “[c]ontinued advancements in land-based
turbines and offshore wind technologies enhance wind power opportunities
in every geographic region of the United States.”278 The Department
indicated its intent to update the team’s findings periodically,279 and future
reports will incorporate the latest technological advances in connection with
the generation of wind power.280 In FCC v. Fox, Justice Scalia credited the
fact that the Commission’s “stepped-up enforcement policy” against
broadcasts of fleeting expletives was made possible by “technological
advances.”281 New technology made “it easier for broadcasters” to censor

272
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programming and “bleep out offending words” that “foul-mouthed
glitteratae” were wont to utter.282
To be sure, the relevant technological or scientific knowledge will
ultimately become fixed, at least for current regulatory purposes, by an
agency’s decision to impose certain regulatory requirements at a given point
in time. This fact may prevent agencies from incorporating cutting edge
research that is not yet sufficiently conclusive to support a particular
regulatory requirement.283 Still, as Holly Doremus explains, regulation, like
underlying research, “is not set in stone” and is “always subject to
reexamination and refinement as the information base improves.”284
Agencies are therefore able to make policy based on the best available
scientific or technological data today and update that policy as underlying
data evolves. Certainly, Congress did not intend for agencies to promulgate
regulations based on the best available evidence that was available at the
time of the rulemaking and then close their eyes to subsequent scientific or
technological advances. Still less did Congress intend for agencies to fix
regulatory requirements based only on what Congress knew when it enacted
the underlying statute. If Congress had intended to do either of those things,
it could have fixed the requirements itself, and it would not have delegated
to agencies the power to revisit their regulations. For example, Congress did
not intend the Endangered Species Act to protect only those species that
were recognized as endangered when the Act was passed in 1973.285 Other
statutes calling for expert inquiry require the same dynamic understanding.
Admittedly, ease of change may not be the first thing that comes to mind
when one thinks of administrative agencies, and the degree to which inaction
has plagued some regulatory efforts is well known.286 The special value of
agency capacity for updating expert judgments becomes obvious, however,
when one considers a positive procedural account of agency capacity for
implementing change relative to that of other governmental actors. As
previously noted, Congress has chosen to delegate expert decisions to
agencies in a wide variety of regulatory contexts. Even where Congress
could theoretically muster the resources and expertise to legislate a specific
legislative solution to a particular problem, it would be difficult for Congress
282

Id. at 518, 527. Justice Breyer argued in dissent that the Commission had failed to give adequate
consideration to whether smaller broadcasters could afford bleeping technology. Id. at 556–57 (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
283
Clifford Grobstein, Saccharin: A Scientist’s View, in THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF HEALTH AND
SAFETY REGULATION 117, 126 (Robert W. Crandall & Lester B. Lave eds., 1981) (noting that agencies
cannot incorporate knowledge at the forefront of scientific research because it presents uncertain
“concepts still being evaluated”).
284
Doremus, supra note 16, at 414.
285
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–32 (1976).
286
Wagner (1995), supra note 25, at 1677 (describing the slow pace of agencies in setting toxic
standards).
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to update legislation quickly or frequently, particularly if Congress were
required to do so with respect to every substantive area within the aegis of
the administrative state.287
The President may change policies quickly, but it is doubtful that a
single executive actor could even attempt to master the sheer volume of
issues that require decision in the modern administrative state. This last point
may not be obvious, given President Trump’s recent attempts to curtail
regulation through a series of executive orders.288 Ultimately, however,
regulatory outcomes cannot be imposed by executive decree, as Congress
has charged agencies, and not the President, with the responsibility for
making final decisions in most regulatory programs.289 Nor may agencies
implement the President’s agenda without any explanation of the facts or
issues that congressional mandates have made relevant to those decisions.290
Thus, given the undeniable requirement that agencies offer some explanation
for regulatory changes, the question becomes whether expert agency
analysis adds value to administrative decision making. The positive
procedural account of administrative change, which is discussed in Part C,
below, illustrates how expert analysis can enhance regulatory decisions and
serve a broader function than mere implementation of executive policy
preferences. Further, the ultimate issue reflects more than a tradeoff between
executive and agency decision making, because Congress could always
leave specific policy decisions to courts rather than agencies.291 The
following sections will compare the relative capacities of courts and
agencies for updating policy in light of scientific or technological changes.
B. The Courts’ Comparative Disadvantage in Updating Expert Decisions
Congress is not required to delegate technical or scientific decisions to
administrative agencies. Courts can also resolve scientific questions left
287

See supra Part II and text accompanying notes 217–22 (discussing limits of Congress’s ability
to legislate with specificity).
288
In addition to orders directing rollbacks of particular regulations, the President has also mandated
that agencies eliminate two existing regulations for every new regulation they promulgate. See supra text
accompanying note 54.
289
Peter L. Strauss, Foreword: Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law,
75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 759–60 (2007) (“[I]n the ordinary world of domestic administration, where
Congress has delegated responsibilities to a particular governmental actor it has created, that delegation
is a part of the law whose faithful execution the President is to assure” by “[o]versight, and not decision
. . . .”).
290
In State Farm, all nine Justices rejected NHTSA’s completely unexplained rescission of airbag
requirements. See supra text accompanying notes 36–38. Nor have any scholars advocating political
control challenged this aspect of State Farm’s decision. See supra notes 6–9.
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open by Congress, and, in areas such as antitrust law, judges decide complex
economic issues (or questions of social science) without affording
significant deference to administrative agencies.292 Still, generalist judges
lack the kind of expertise that agencies have. Although nothing prevents the
President from appointing a judge with specific expertise in a particular
field,293 a single expert decision maker cannot replicate the combined
expertise present across all the agencies in our system;294 and such a decision
maker would have only limited influence in an adjudicatory system
comprised of almost a thousand federal judges in any event.295 Moreover,
agency experts draw on knowledge from fields that run the gamut from
economics to medicine to engineering. Judges can sometimes add to their
knowledge base by hiring specialized clerks296 or relying on the expertise
embodied in briefs,297 but those resources pale in comparison to an agency’s
ability to hire large expert staffs or consult outside experts free from the
ethical constraints imposed on judges.298
Even if judges could muddle through technical or scientific issues and
arrive at a reasonable decision, courts are also poorly positioned to update
judicial decisions to reflect new learning and changed circumstances. To
begin with, stare decisis imposes a substantial impediment to change.299 At
the federal level, even if an individual district judge were inclined to set aside
a particular precedent, vertical stare decisis would prevent her from
disregarding precedent established by the relevant court of appeals or the
Supreme Court. Vertical stare decisis also compels the courts of appeals to
follow Supreme Court precedent.300
292

Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust and Democracy, 45 FLA. ST. L. REV. 807, 837–40 (2019).
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Horizontal stare decisis makes change even more difficult. Federal
appellate panels are bound to follow rulings of earlier panels, unless the en
banc court overrules the panel.301 The Supreme Court will also follow its
earlier precedent unless a majority of the Court decides that the earlier
decision should be overruled. That will not happen in most cases: the small
number of cases that the Court agrees to hear each year affords few
opportunities to overrule even outdated precedents.302 In addition, some
Justices may be reluctant to overrule precedents except in the clearest cases,
not only because of the institutional value of stability, but also because of a
fear that overruling precedent may encourage the public to give less
credence to the Court’s objectivity.303 Finally, litigants wishing to overturn
precedents cannot jump straight to the Supreme Court or even to the court
of appeals. Litigants must instead be willing to endure the cost of lengthy
litigation that starts with a series of unfavorable lower court decisions and
may ultimately prove futile. In administrative law cases, the long march may
actually begin with lengthy administrative proceedings.
Moreover, district and circuit court judges neither set their own agendas
nor have much control over the legal issues they will be required to decide.
As Justice Scalia noted in his dissent in United States v. Windsor:304
[D]eclaring the compatibility of state or federal laws with the
Constitution is not only not the “primary role” of this Court, it
is not a separate, free-standing role at all. We perform that role
incidentally—by accident, as it were—when that is necessary
to resolve the dispute before us. Then, and only then, does it
become “the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is.”305
Judges are charged with deciding only the issues that are brought to them by
litigants, and they are constrained to base their decisions on the record
evidence compiled by the district court or the agency whose determinations
they are reviewing.306 While the Supreme Court (unlike the lower federal
301
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courts) has discretion over its docket, it is similarly constrained in the sense
that it must generally select cases and issues from the pool of cases and
issues that have already been litigated in the lower federal courts, the federal
agencies, or the state courts.307 These constraints limit the Court’s ability to
resolve significant issues. For example, the Court has never had occasion to
directly overrule Korematsu v. United States,308 and even last term, in Trump
v. Hawaii, Chief Justice Roberts was constrained to note that Korematsu had
only “been overruled in the court of history.”309
Even when litigants have a substantial basis for asking the courts to alter
legal rules because of changed circumstances, the judicial process is not well
equipped to address evolving understandings of science and technology.
Judges tend to decide issues narrowly, incrementally, and based on rules that
have been applied in the past.310 This backward-looking framework tethers
judges to past decisions with similar facts. Consider Lon Fuller’s classic
description of adjudication. As Fuller observes, a judge deciding whether a
horse belongs to its original owner or a party who has procured the horse by
fraud will consider how other courts have addressed similar issues (perhaps
ownership of a horse procured by physical theft) in the past.311 A judge
would not apply a brand new rule to a recurring situation unless he or she
were willing (and able) to overrule a precedent the judge deemed
erroneous.312 Judicial remedies are also incremental insofar as they apply
only to the parties to a particular lawsuit,313 operate retroactively,314 and
produce a definitive statement of rights and duties.315
These gradual, backwards-looking, and definitive features of
adjudicative decisions may contribute to a stable rule of law, but they are illequipped to produce decisions that must accommodate scientific or
technological change. By nature, such advances tend to upend past practice
and may occur in fits and starts rather than incrementally.316 Moreover, for
matters of science or technology, the impetus to capitalize on improvements
resulting from change is fundamental: it is unthinkable, for example, that
307
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any physician would advise a cancer patient in 2019 to undergo treatment
based on the best medical treatment available in 2009. Lawyers, on the other
hand, typically make arguments based on longstanding precedent and past
practice, while avoiding arguments that may seem overly imaginative,
creative, or novel. Wishing to avoid reversal, judges likewise avoid the
appearance of “[c]reativity and imagination,” which are “valued qualities”
in science.317
Lon Fuller also thought that courts could not handle polycentric
problems—the sort of multidimensional and interrelated problems that are
often the meat of administrative proceedings. Fuller analogized these
polycentric problems to a “spider[’s] web,” in which a “pull on one strand
will distribute tensions after a complicated pattern throughout the web as a
whole.”318 In his time, Fuller thought those problems were exemplified by
governmentally imposed price controls.319 When the United States imposed
certain price controls during World War II, for example, “the agencies
charged with allocative tasks did not attempt to follow the forms of
adjudication.”320 This was a situation, Fuller suggested, that presented “too
strong a polycentric aspect to be suitable for adjudication.”321
Fuller based his analysis on the need for allocative determinations in
problem areas that antedated the kind of technological and scientific
questions that Congress has delegated to agencies in more recent decades.322
Still, Fuller’s example of wage and price controls implicates an economic
problem that is not difficult solely because it is multidimensional and
interrelated or requires expert judgment. Critically, it is also difficult
because it is dynamic. Indeed, with respect to wage and price controls, Fuller
notes that “courts move too slowly to keep up with a rapidly changing
economic scene,” and that they “cannot encompass and take into account
the complex repercussions that may result from any change in prices or
wages.”323
The reasons are obvious. Dynamic circumstances present a crucial
obstacle to the application of an incremental and backwards-looking
adjudicative process: relevant inputs, such as the number of qualified
workers and the demand for particular products, will change over time.
Further, changes in underlying facts may be accompanied both by changes
in economic theory on how to measure demand and by changed policy views
on questions like the percentage of profits that should be allocated to
workers. All of these variables make questions of wage or price control
317
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unsuitable for judicial resolution. In addition, the multidimensional and
interrelated nature of many polycentric problems will unfold over time, as
solutions to particular problems create unintended consequences. For
example, a parent who keeps his or her children inside to protect them from
abduction may find that their lack of exercise and increased screen time
decreases their physical fitness. A static mechanism that attempts to resolve
safety issues early on cannot adjust for unintended consequences of this
sort.324
Given the judicial branch’s many limitations with respect to polycentric
disputes involving technical or scientific questions, it should not surprise
that Congress has largely chosen to delegate questions of this sort to
agencies. When there have been exceptions, most notably in the area of
antitrust, courts have struggled to keep legal rules up to date. For example,
most cases arising under the federal antitrust laws require courts to make
economically-informed competition policy determinations when deciding
claims brought by private parties, the Department of Justice, or the FTC.325
But courts have lagged behind developments in economic thought. The
Supreme Court, for example, has lagged far behind the rise and fall of the
Chicago School as a dominant theory for assessing competition policy.
Starting in the 1960s, the Chicago School critiqued antitrust decisions for
failing to recognize that markets would often self-correct or that antitrust
liability would often stifle efficient business practices.326 The Supreme Court
accepted some of the Chicago School’s theoretical arguments in the 1970s
when it adopted a rule of reason test (and thus allowed an efficiency defense)
for territorial distribution restraints in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc.327 Although the available theoretical arguments also supported
a relaxed rule for distributional restraints involving resale price,328 the Court
did not change the rule of per se illegality for resale price maintenance for
the next twenty years.
Thus, even by the late 1990s—almost twenty years after GTE
Sylvania—Judge Richard A. Posner of the Seventh Circuit was still obliged
324
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(discussing Justice Breyer’s use of “technocratic solutions”).
326
ROBERT H. BORK , THE A NTITRUST PARADOX : A POLICY AT WAR WITH I TSELF (1978).
327
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dealing with the free-rider problem” that undermines the ability of manufacturers to ensure point of sale
services at the retail level.).
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to follow precedent rendering maximum resale price maintenance illegal per
se when he wrote the panel opinion in Khan v. State Oil Co.329 While the
Supreme Court later overruled the per se rule against maximum resale price
maintenance in State Oil Co. v. Khan,330 that decision did not undo
controlling precedent applying a per se rule to minimum resale price
maintenance—that only came a decade later in Leegin Creative Leather
Products v. PSKS, Inc.331 Thus, the lower federal courts were precluded from
considering the Chicago School’s theoretical justifications for all categories
of distribution restraints until thirty years after the Court’s initial acceptance
of these arguments in 1977.
Ironically, by about the time that the Supreme Court incorporated
Chicago School theory into its entire line of distribution restraint decisions,
leading scholars had questioned the Chicago School’s theoretical
assumptions as ill-conceived and badly out of date.332 As Justice Breyer
pointed out in his dissent in Leegin, empirical evidence showed that,
contrary to the Chicago School’s predictions, there were significant retail
price increases in states where federal and state law authorized resale price
maintenance for a limited period of time.333 Since Leegin, scholars have
identified a growing body of empirical evidence associating resale price
maintenance agreements with anticompetitive increases in consumer
prices.334 Moreover, while the Chicago School assumed the desirability of
protecting the ability of manufacturers to guarantee in-store, point of sale
services, more recent internet sellers like Amazon have wooed countless
customers by forsaking these very point of sale services. The specific fact
patterns before the Court in GTE Sylvania addressed a plausible need for
point of sale services for television sets in the 1970s, and in Leegin the
weakly plausible (at best) need for point of sale services for women’s
accessories in 2007. By their nature, these decisions could not consider
different types of products, such as books, for which point of sale services
may be irrelevant. Nor could the final judicial pronouncements in GTE
Sylvania and Leegin adjust to accommodate new market conditions or the
329

93 F.3d 1358, 1363 (7th Cir. 1996).
522 U.S. 3, 7 (1997).
331
551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007).
332
Amanda P. Reeves & Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, 86 IND. L.J. 1527, 1586 (2011)
(“The Supreme Court’s economic thinking, as reflected in . . . Leegin, still lags.”).
333
Leegin, 551 U.S. at 912–13 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that “most economists today agree”
that “resale price maintenance tends to increase consumer prices” (citation omitted)).
334
This evidence ranges from admissions to anticompetitive use of resale price maintenance by
horizontal cartel participants to market comparisons showing significant price increases in states where
the rule of reason applied post-Leegin. See Jonathan B. Baker, Taking the Error Out of “Error Cost”
Analysis, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 18 (2015) (“[A] recent study of a sample of convicted contemporary
international cartels concludes that at least one quarter used vertical restraints to support collusion.”); id.
at 21 (noting that, in a study done after Leegin, states following the rule of reason had “higher” prices
and “lower” output than states that retained the per se rule as a matter of state law).
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fact that point of sale services seem to be growing irrelevant for more and
more categories of products, which probably now include televisions and
women’s accessories.
Although antitrust scholars continue to debate rules of antitrust liability
for distribution restraints, proponents of both theories should find judicial
antitrust decisions ill-equipped to keep pace with advances in economic
learning. From the Chicago School perspective, the Court allowed an
outdated precedent to proscribe potentially efficient resale price
maintenance agreements for at least thirty years. From a post-Chicago or
behavioral perspective, the Court’s Leegin decision condoned at least a
decade of increased consumer prices, premised on unrealistic assumptions
about the desirability of point of sale services. Even astute judges can only
do so much.335 Because courts have limited ability to update their decisions,
Congress cannot expect judges to incorporate new economic learning either
quickly or thoroughly when it delegates expert decisions to them.
C. The Superior Capacity of Agencies to Accommodate Change
Agencies can update policies to reflect advances in scientific learning or
expertise better than courts. Courts are constrained to issue orders on a caseby-case basis, resolve only the particular disputes that litigants bring to them,
and decide only the legal issues that cannot be avoided if the dispute is to be
resolved. Agencies, on the other hand, are not limited to issuing adjudicatory
orders. Agencies can also resolve a broad range of questions through the
promulgation of binding rules and a panoply of less formal actions,
including advisory opinions, guidance documents, information gathering
concerning industry problems or policy issues, and the publication of studies
and reports.336 Decisions made outside of the formal adjudication process
are not limited by an official record requirement,337 and, in some cases,
agencies may also consult expert panels when making decisions.338
Rulemaking offers agencies the broadest and most stable manner of
changing policy, and agencies may alter existing rules so long as they use
an appropriate rulemaking procedure to do so.339 This procedural
335
See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that the court had “given
the agency the benefit of the doubt out of deference for the terrible complexity of its job” and the task it
faced in resolving expert issues fit for “engineers, computer modelers, economists or statisticians”).
336
5 U.S.C. §§ 553–57 (2012); G ELLHORN & BYSE , ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND
COMMENTS 66–67 (11th ed. 2011) (describing informal information gathering activities); Mark H.
Grunewald, The NLRB’s First Rulemaking: An Exercise in Pragmatism, 41 D UKE L.J. 274, 277–82
(1991); M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1386
(2004).
337
5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
338
Vermeule, supra note 298, at 2239.
339
Agencies do not need to promulgate rules before announcing a new standard in an adjudication,
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947), and they do not need to engage in rulemaking to change
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requirement has sometimes raised concerns over ossification, that is, an
institutional reluctance to alter possibly outmoded rules because of the time
and effort required to promulgate new ones.340 Recent research suggests that
ossification concerns may have been overstated,341 however, and ossification
does not “bind” an agency in the same way that stare decisis binds courts in
any event. Further, while expert decision making necessarily requires a
slower decision making process than policy changes based on whim or
political preference alone, agencies that invest the time necessary to change
rules can alter policy on a broad and uniform national scale.342 While agency
decision making may be time consuming, the months or years that an agency
may invest in rulemaking will often pale in comparison to the decades it may
take to litigate a complete set of issues through the judicial system to final
decision by the Supreme Court.
Unlike courts, agencies can also alter standards contained in existing
rules, orders, or guidance statements without waiting for private parties to
initiate a proceeding.343 In addition, agencies may choose to update existing
policies on their own initiative, based on internal agency analysis or prompts
from the President or Congress.344 Whatever the source of the nudge,
however, the ultimate decision must be taken by the agency that Congress
has placed in charge of making applicable policy.
Nor do traditional rules of stare decisis limit agencies in reconsidering
existing decisions. To understand that issue, one must appreciate two
different “mode[s] of reasoning” involved in agency decisions,345 which
Randy Kozel and Jeff Pojanowski have helpfully described as “expositive”
and “prescriptive.”346 An agency engages in prescriptive reasoning when it
“exercises its discretion to implement a legislative directive by weighing
evidence, utilizing technical expertise, and making policy choices.”347
Expositive reasoning, on the other hand, occurs when an agency seeks to

policy that was initially adopted in informal guidance, Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199,
1203 (2015).
340
See Wendy Wagner et al., Dynamic Rulemaking, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 183, 188, 199 (2017)
(discussing the process of regulation review that occurs at the agency level and noting the fact that
different agencies may be subject to “different rulemaking procedures”).
341
Id. at 259.
342
Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s
Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1094–96 (1987).
343
See id. at 1116–17 (acknowledging the “increasing[] . . . complex[ity]” of the legal system and
“limited resources” of the Supreme Court).
344
5 U.S.C. § 555(a)–(e) (2012). See also Kagan, supra note 6, at 2254 (describing how three types
of administrative control “bleed” into one another).
345
Kozel & Pojanowski, supra note 9, at 141–46.
346
Id. at 141–42.
347
Id.
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determine “what Congress actually intended with respect to a particular
issue.”348
Neither form of agency reasoning is subject to traditional rules of stare
decisis. Courts review expositive decisions, in which agencies ascertain
statutory meaning, under a variety of deference doctrines.349 These
deference doctrines place varying degrees of weight on consistency with
past interpretive decisions made by agencies350 and courts,351 but none rise
to the level of uniformity required by stare decisis.352 On the other hand,
courts address changes in prescriptive decisions under the “arbitrary and
capricious” standard of review, which focuses on the agency’s reasoning
process and allows an agency to alter its policies so long as it adequately
explains its reasons for doing so.353
Unlike courts, agencies are not tied to backwards looking standards
when setting regulatory policy. Instead, advances in expert or scientific
knowledge have often enabled agencies to adopt new regulatory responses
to recurring and evolving problems. For example, when Federal Reserve
Chairman Ben Bernanke was confronted with the 2008 financial crisis, he
was able to avoid the policy mistakes that are now thought to have
348

Id.
See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1099 tbl. 1
(2008) (listing various deference doctrines such as Consultative Deference, Skidmore, Beth Israel,
Chevron, etc.).
350
Compare Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863 (1984) (holding
that the fact that the EPA has “from time to time changed its interpretation” does not lead to a conclusion
that “no deference should be accorded to the agency’s interpretation of the statute” at issue), with
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (holding that the validity of an agency’s judgments,
such as rulings, interpretations, and opinions, will “depend upon . . . [their] consistency with earlier and
later pronouncements”).
351
Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005) (“Some
of the respondents dispute this conclusion, on the ground that the Commission’s interpretation is
inconsistent with its past practice. We reject this argument. Agency inconsistency is not a basis for
declining to analyze the agency’s interpretation under the Chevron framework. Unexplained
inconsistency is, at most, a reason for holding an interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious change
from agency practice under the Administrative Procedure Act.”).
352
See supra notes 350–51.
353
5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 34 (1983) (applying the arbitrary and capricious standard). To be sure, the line
between expository and prescriptive reasoning may not always be clear: scientific questions could either
be addressed directly by Congress or left to agencies with an open-ended delegation of authority. See
Catherine M. Sharkey, Cutting in on the Chevron Two-Step, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2359, 2438 (2018)
(noting that while agency expertise is at the center of a court’s analysis, courts will still require agencies
to prove “reasoned decisionmaking” under the Chevron-State Farm model). Nevertheless, given
Congress’s widespread use of open-ended administrative statutes, see Christine Chabot, Selling Chevron,
67 A DMIN . L. REV . 481, 510–12 (2015), and its concomitant grant of large swaths of agency discretion
on matters that turn on scientific or other forms of expertise, the principal concern of this Article is with
the role of expert discretion in agency alterations of prescriptive decisions. This analysis also sets to one
side the growing debate over Chevron deference in judicial review of agency decisions.
349
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354

exacerbated the Great Depression. Instead, Bernanke was able to facilitate
“innovations” that “resulted in large increases in the amount of Federal
Reserve credit extended to the banking system.”355 Similarly, when laws
encouraging good motoring behavior failed to stem the flood of fatalities
caused by automobile accidents, NHTSA was able to implement a new
approach,356 namely technology-forcing performance standards that
required vehicle manufacturers to implement safer motor vehicle design.357
Although it took time to secure improvements such as seatbelts and airbags,
NHTSA estimates that its vehicle safety technology requirements have
saved over 500,000 lives.358 In other instances, scientific advances have
prompted agencies to update health policies such as vaccination
recommendations359 and dietary recommendations for pregnant women.360
Sometimes these advances have even required agencies to confront new
regulatory problems such as the relationship between greenhouse gas
emissions and climate change.361
Problems involving science or other forms of expertise also tend to be
polycentric and can therefore benefit from analytical procedures that break
down their multifaceted and interrelated issues into manageable units of
354

Gary Richardson, The Great Depression, FED. RES. HIST. (Nov. 22, 2013),
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/great_depression (describing how the Federal Reserve
inadvertently “hurt the economy” when it decided to raise interest rates in 1928, 1929, and 1931 and
failed to act as a lender of last resort in response to banking panics).
355
Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Address at the Greater Austin Chamber of
Commerce: Federal Reserve Policies in the Financial Crisis (Dec. 1, 2008), available at
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20081201a.htm.
356
Jerry L. Mashaw, The Story of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the U.S. v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.: Law, Science and Politics in the Administrative State, in
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 335, 337–39 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006).
357
Id. at 339.
358
NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., DOT HS 812 069, LIVES
SAVED BY VEHICLE SAFETY TECHNOLOGIES AND ASSOCIATED FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
STANDARDS,
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TO
2012:
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xii
(2015),
https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812069 (“The report estimates that vehicle
safety technologies saved 613,501 lives from 1960 through 2012, including 27,621 in 2012.”); see also
Karen Wiswall, Safety Standards Make an Impact, REG. REV. (Mar. 25, 2015),
https://www.theregreview.org/2015/03/25/wiswall-safety-impact/ (“Since 1960, car safety technologies,
like the seat belts, air bags, and braking systems to which these standards apply, have helped save more
than half a million lives.”).
359
The CDC now recommends only two HPV shots for younger adolescents. CDC Recommends
Only Two HPV Shots for Younger Adolescents, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Oct. 19,
2016), https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2016/p1020-HPV-shots.html (noting that the CDC
previously recommended three doses to protect against cancers caused by HPV).
360
FDA and EPA Issue Final Fish Consumption Advice, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 18,
2017), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm537362.htm.
361
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 505 (2007) (“Calling global warming ‘the most
pressing environmental challenge of our time,’ a group of States, local governments, and private
organizations alleged in a petition for certiorari that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has
abdicated its responsibility under the Clean Air Act to regulate the emissions of four greenhouse gases,
including carbon dioxide.”).
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analysis. In many cases, for example, science may provide limited
information upon which to base a policy decision, especially at the frontiers
of knowledge.362 Oliver Williamson, the 2009 Nobel Laureate in Economic
Sciences,363 has proposed a helpful “decision process approach” that
regulators may apply in cases of scientific uncertainty.364 Williamson’s
approach makes use of a decision tree to order and identify discrete choices
and break down the costs and benefits relevant to each choice.365 As
explained below, this approach plays to the strengths of the regulatory
process. It is quite different from the procedure that leads courts to develop
a binary and permanent decision based on arguments made by a limited
group of parties.
To illustrate Williamson’s proposal, consider a regulatory scheme that
focuses on the elimination of health hazards associated with food additives.
Sometimes, for example, a food dye that might pose a serious but
unquantified health risk will have a close substitute that does not pose the
same risk. In this case, it is not necessary to confront uncertainty over the
precise level of risk presented by the initial dye, because the regulator can
simply steer consumers toward the dye that does not present the risk.366 If
there is not a ready substitute, however, a regulator should further calibrate
different costs of limiting consumer access to a potentially risky product.
For example, would removal of the dye eliminate countervailing health
benefits for some users or cut off significant economic benefits to the
manufacturer of the product?367 Williamson also notes that risks posed by a
weak carcinogen like saccharin may be outweighed by weight control
benefits,368 and that even potent carcinogens like the aflatoxins found in
peanut butter may be necessary to offer an “inexpensive form of protein.”369
It may also be the case that health risks associated with certain products
are borne only by particular users, or that the costs of certain regulations are
borne disproportionately by particular industries.370 With respect to the
former problem, a regulator may be able to craft a limited regulatory solution
aimed at protecting a particular group of users. Thus, a warning that pregnant
women should not consume alcoholic beverages might provide a better
362

Grobstein, supra note 283, at 126 (noting that science is “rarely decisive in policy making,” and
that research at the forefront of knowledge presents uncertain “concepts still being evaluated and possibly
yet to be modified”).
363
Oliver E. Williamson – Facts, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economicsciences/2009/williamson/facts/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2019).
364
Oliver Williamson, Saccharin: An Economist’s View, in THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF HEALTH AND
SAFETY REGULATION 131, 142 (Robert W. Crandall & Lester B. Lave eds., 1981).
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Id. at 145.
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Id. at 147–48.
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See id. at 145.
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Id. at 148.
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Id. at 149.
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Williamson, supra note 364, at 145.
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solution than an absolute ban on the sale of alcoholic beverages. Regulators
might also be expected to refrain from promulgating general rules that do
not adequately address disproportionate effects on a single industry.371
In addition, Williamson’s recommendation that agencies break down
decisions into discrete sub-issues could provide a helpful framework for
agencies to address the problem of change as scientific or technological
knowledge grows. Thus, a complete ban on dye supported by research
establishing some level of health risk might be ripe for revision if new
research clarified that health risks existed only for children under a certain
age or that new manufacturing processes could cheaply remove the
ingredient associated with health risks. This capacity for change allows an
agency to regulate with confidence in the present despite the necessarily
uncertain state of scientific knowledge. Williamson’s approach allows the
agency to acknowledge the provisional nature of its initial findings and gives
it the flexibility to adjust policies as scientific knowledge progresses.
To the extent that an agency is willing to make its particular regulatory
priorities transparent, Williamson’s analytical framework will also enhance
political accountability. An agency might identify the current state of
scientific knowledge, the scope of uncertainty surrounding that knowledge,
and the policy priorities it will apply in the face of uncertainty.372 This
granular analysis could clarify, for example, whether a particular
administration prioritizes eliminating cost to industry or protecting children
or perhaps even less quantifiable concerns such as human dignity. These
factors may gain importance where scientific knowledge remains uncertain.
Conversely, as scientific knowledge becomes more certain, agencies should
have less room to prioritize discretionary factors or to adopt a policy
contrary to scientific evidence.373
Williamson’s framework appropriately recognizes that many scientific
and technical problems are complex and unlikely to present a single
objective answer to important policy problems. To be sure, Williamson
seems to call for a level of analytical transparency that may be difficult to
obtain.374 Nevertheless, the tradeoffs acknowledged by Williamson’s
procedural framework are well within the ken of regulators. Williamson’s
371

United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 253 (2d Cir. 1977) (invalidating
the general rule which failed to address the possibility that its standards would render canned whitefish
unmarketable).
372
Williamson notes, for example, that non-health benefits or efficiency benefits can also be
considered in the decision making framework. Williamson, supra note 364, at 145.
373
In State Farm, it was “surely . . . not enough” for NHTSA to ignore evidence on safety benefits
of airbags on the ground “that the regulated industry . . . eschewed” airbags. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n
of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 48–49 (1983).
374
See Wagner (1995), supra note 25, at 1677 (“Since the task of determining levels of toxins that
are ‘safe’ is misidentified as one that must be answered by science, and is typically in the first instance
assigned to agency scientists, it is not surprising that few answers come forward.”).
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framework also plays to the particular procedural strengths of agencies.
They can regulate around uncertain levels of risk, incorporate political
factors, and adjust their policies as scientific knowledge evolves. Courts, on
the other hand, do not generally issue provisional decisions that
acknowledge uncertainty;375 they also avoid overt reference to political
factors376 and do not generally consider the interests of non-parties who may
be affected by their rulings.
One of us has previously written about cases arising out of the AIDS
epidemic as an illustration of the problems that courts face when they decide
cases “at the frontiers of scientific knowledge.”377 In the early 1990s, courts
were required to decide whether persons with HIV posed a “significant risk”
of transmitting HIV to others in work, school, or healthcare environments.378
Rather than refining the “significant risk” test “through common law
development,”379 later courts essentially “redefin[ed] . . . the test” as one that
would be satisfied by “the existence of any risk rather than the existence of
a significant risk.”380 While this test was easier for courts to apply, it failed
to protect persons with HIV from unwarranted discrimination.381
That article attributed the courts’ failures to the difficulties of using
adjudication to solve a polycentric problem.382 Although courts approached
the issue of “significant risk” as “raising only factual issues,”383 assessment
of risk ultimately implicated normative concerns as well as scientific
knowledge,384 which was initially limited and “provisional.”385 From the
vantage point of 2018, it seems that the potentially provisional nature of
scientific knowledge may have posed overwhelming challenges for these
courts. The possibility that scientific knowledge would change may have
driven courts to adopt an overly precautionary standard in the 1990s. If
subsequent studies identified higher or different transmission risks of HIV

375
See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 900 (2007) (concluding
that “[s]tare decisis . . . does not compel . . . continued adherence to the per se rule against vertical price
restraints”).
376
“It is said that ‘[m]ost judges would sooner admit to grand larceny than confess a political
interest or motivation.’” Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of
Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 N W . U. L. REV . 251, 262 (1997) (alteration in original)
(quoting ROBERT A. CARP & RONALD STIDHAM , THE J UDICIAL PROCESS IN A MERICA 301 (3d ed.
1996)).
377
Barry Sullivan, When the Environment is Other People: An Essay on Science, Culture, and the
Authoritative Allocation of Values, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 597, 603 (1994).
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Id. at 599–600.
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(which was at the time a life-threatening virus), the risk assessment in initial
cases would not have left an appropriate balance in place.
The article also argued that handing off part of the decision to an
administrative agency could improve risk analysis. Although courts would
still be required to ensure that persons with HIV were protected from
discrimination, agencies could assist courts in the underlying determination
of whether there was a “significant risk” of transmission.386 An expert
agency would be better positioned to apply Williamson’s decision making
framework and consider substitute measures (perhaps precautionary
measures instead of an outright ban on clinical work by dental students with
HIV, for example) and indirect consequences (including the overall impact
on the supply of dentists).387
Of course, merely involving an agency capable of evaluating relevant
costs and benefits provides no guarantee of success, and that was especially
true in the politically and emotionally charged climate that characterized the
early years of the AIDS epidemic. Indeed, the article recounts that early
attempts by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) to address the risks of
HIV transmission from and to health care workers ultimately failed,388 and
difficult decisions were simply passed on to the health care industry.389 This
may illustrate that there are no perfect solutions to the most difficult
problems. The CDC, however, was ultimately able to update its policies to
better reflect scientific knowledge.390
As these examples suggest, agencies apply technical and scientific
knowledge to a variety of difficult issues. The difficulty of the questions that
agencies confront, together with the often-uncertain state of relevant
knowledge, means that many questions will not yield indisputably clear
answers. Indeed, as underlying science or technical knowledge changes, the
best answer today may well become suboptimal, dated, or patently wrong
tomorrow. Agencies are uniquely situated to adjust policies and replace
inferior, dated, or incorrect conclusions with findings that better reflect the
state of underlying knowledge.
To be sure, the benefits of an agency’s ability to change policies are not
limited to scientific or technical decisions within an agency’s area of
expertise. One might also favor the ability of an agency to effectuate change

386

See id. at 689–90 (advocating a procedure whereby courts take guidance from agencies without
“abdicating their responsibilities to administration”).
387
Id. at 665.
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Id. at 684–85.
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See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, HIV Transmission, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/basics/transmission.html (last updated July 22, 2019) (clarifying that
HIV is not spread by air, water, saliva, sweat, or tears and that even for health care workers, the “main
risk of HIV transmission . . . from being stuck with an HIV-contaminated needle . . . is less than 1%”).
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from the viewpoint of transparency and political accountability. The
important point here, however, is that the ability to change favors both the
expertise and political rationales for administrative agencies. Insofar as
Congress has required agencies to base decisions on an expert analysis of
scientific or technical evidence, one cannot simply eliminate agency
expertise and allow agencies to regulate based on political considerations
alone. The unique ability of agencies to effectuate change makes them
specially positioned to improve policies by accommodating advances in
science or technology. Thus, a rule requiring agencies to exercise expert
discretion when changing policies helps advance this goal. On the other
hand, a rule allowing agencies to substitute raw political preferences for
expert discretion eliminates a significant advantage that agencies can
provide in the policymaking arena and discounts the value that expert
analysis may provide in the realm of policy change.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT HAS STRUGGLED TO STRIKE AN APPROPRIATE
BALANCE BETWEEN AGENCY EXPERTISE AND POLITICAL WILL
Courts have struggled for decades to strike an appropriate balance
between agency expertise and political will. Under section 706 of the
Administrative Procedure Act, courts review agency policy decisions,
including changes in policy, under the arbitrary and capricious standard of
review.392 Although section 706 itself does not specifically mention agency
expertise, it requires reviewing courts to “set aside” agency action found to
be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.”393 Section 706 also directs courts to make this
determination based on a review of “the whole record or those parts of it
cited by a party.”394 In its 1971 decision in Citizens to Protect Overton Park
v. Volpe,395 the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of an agency’s
decisional record to a reviewing court’s ability to ensure that the agency
actually considered “the relevant factors” that Congress identified.396
The Court’s application of the arbitrary and capricious standard of
review has long assumed a baseline of deference to agency exercise of expert
discretion in cases where the agency’s reasoned analysis reveals that such
discretion has been exercised. In Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural

391
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ECON. & ORG. 81, 81–82 (1985).
392
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
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Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
a unanimous Court
deferred to
necessarily predictive scientific determinations underlying a Nuclear
Regulatory Commission rulemaking.399 The Court noted that the
Commission’s predictions regarding the environmental impact of nuclear
waste were “within its area of special expertise, at the frontiers of
science.”400 According to the Court, “this kind of scientific determination”
generally requires a reviewing court to be at its “most deferential.”401
A. State Farm: Politics Versus Expertise
In State Farm, the Reagan Administration asked the Court to extend
Baltimore Gas’s paradigm of strong deference to cases in which agencies
substitute political concerns for expert analysis.402 The Court refused to
capitulate to the Reagan Administration’s swift regulatory rollbacks and
instead adopted the “hard look” standard of arbitrary and capricious
review.403 All nine Justices invalidated NHTSA’s decision to eliminate
existing automobile safety requirements without any explanation
whatsoever. The Court split in a five-to-four vote, however, on NHTSA’s
cursory rejection of data that associated safety benefits with alternative
automobile safety requirements. The majority held that NHTSA’s rejection
was too superficial to constitute “the product of reasoned
decisionmaking,”404 whereas the dissent deemed NHTSA’s analysis
sufficient in light of political concerns raised by a “change in
administration.”405
The history leading up to the State Farm decision illustrates the daunting
nature of NHTSA’s regulatory mandate. In 1966, Congress began using an
epidemiological approach that supported its decision to make the interiors
of cars safer for occupants during inevitable automobile accidents.406 To that
end, it delegated to the Secretary of Transportation and NHTSA broad
397

462 U.S. 87 (1983).
Justice Powell recused himself in Baltimore Gas. The remaining seven Justices joined Justice
O’Connor’s decision without writing separately.
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Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 462 U.S. at 104; see also Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference,
the Science Obsession, and Judicial Review as Translation of Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733,
741–42 (2011) (discussing the Baltimore Gas decision).
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Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 462 U.S. at 103.
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Id.
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Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42–
43 (1983).
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Id. at 41; Doremus, supra note 16, at 423 (explaining that, in State Farm, “the Court endorsed a
form of hard look”).
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State Farm, 463 U.S. at 52; see also Doremus, supra note 16, at 423 (noting that State Farm
requires analysis of relevant scientific evidence “even in the absence of an explicit legislative science
mandate”).
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State Farm, 463 U.S. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Id. at 33 (majority opinion).
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discretion to adopt automobile safety standards that “shall be practicable,
shall meet the need for motor vehicle safety, and shall be stated in objective
terms.”407 The adoption of appropriate safety standards called for
“considerable expertise” and required the Agency to force the creation of
new “technology for building safer cars.”408 NHTSA initially required
manufacturers to incorporate manual seatbelts, but that failed to produce the
desired safety benefits because few motorists chose to buckle up.409 From
the late 1960s into the early 1970s, NHTSA undertook additional efforts to
require passive occupant restraints.410 These efforts spanned several
administrations and were met with great resistance: the automobile industry
railed against these innovations based on costs and practicability,411 and the
public also resisted change.412 A particularly unpopular interim effort to
force seatbelt usage through ignition interlock technology engendered
extreme public opposition and was overruled by Congress.413
By the time of the Carter Administration, however, evidence showed
that passive restraints were technologically and economically feasible, that
they would save over 9000 lives annually,414 and that they would prevent
tens of thousands of injuries.415 As a result, NHSTA promulgated a new rule,
Modified Standard 208, which required car manufacturers to phase in
passive restraint protections by the early to mid-1980s.416 Modified Standard
208 operated as a safety performance standard and allowed manufacturers
to achieve the required safety benefits by choosing between airbags and
automatic seatbelts.417
The political landscape changed with the 1980 election. Drew Lewis,
President Reagan’s new Secretary of Transportation, directed NHTSA to
open a new rulemaking docket to reconsider Modified Standard 208. Lewis
cited “changed economic circumstances” and the “difficulties of the
automobile industry” as reasons for reconsideration.418 NHTSA ultimately
rescinded Modified Standard 208 on the ground that recent manufacturer
initiatives precluded passive restraints from achieving the “significant safety
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Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1392(a)).
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419

benefits” that had been predicted earlier. NHTSA gave two primary
reasons for discounting the benefits of this regulation. First, because ninetynine percent of manufacturers opted to install automatic seatbelts rather than
airbags, the “life-saving potential of airbags would not be realized.”420
Second, because most manufacturers had opted for automatic seatbelts that
could be detached, the Agency expressed substantial doubt that this passive
restraint technology would significantly enhance seatbelt usage and
therefore safety benefits.421
On review, the District of Columbia Circuit found NHTSA’s rescission
arbitrary and capricious under section 706 of the APA,422 and the Supreme
Court affirmed.423 All nine Justices rejected an extreme version of political
deference and agreed that NHTSA’s rescission of airbag and non-detachable
automatic seatbelt requirements was arbitrary and capricious.424 In their
view, NHTSA failed to show that it exercised expert discretion because it
gave no explanation for these rescissions, even though both technologies had
previously been found to enhance safety and supported a final rule
mandating passive restraint technology.425 According to Justice White’s
majority opinion, “[n]ot one sentence” of NHTSA’s “rulemaking statement
discusses the airbags-only option,” and it was “surely . . . not enough that
the regulated industry . . . eschewed” this safety device.426 Further, the
Agency also failed to consider the alternative of non-detachable automatic
seatbelts with continuous spooling technology “in its own right.”427
The Supreme Court premised its analysis on the understanding that
“[e]xpert discretion is the lifeblood of the administrative process.”428 Thus,
rescission of an existing rule requires the same “reasoned analysis for the
change” that applies when an agency promulgates a new rule.429 Further,
while a court may not “substitute its judgment for that of the agency,” a court
must carefully consider whether the agency has “examin[ed] the relevant
data and articulat[ed] a satisfactory explanation” that connects the policy
419
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automatic seatbelt,” even though these technologies were “explicitly approved in the standard the agency
was rescinding”).
428
Id. at 48 (majority opinion) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167
(1962)). Justice Rehnquist joined the Court’s discussions of expertise in parts III and V-A of Justice
White’s opinion. Id. at 57 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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choices made to the facts found, therefore demonstrating the exercise of
expert discretion.430 The Court’s “hard look” standard thus imposes “strict
and demanding” requirements that the agency “cogently explain why it has
exercised its discretion in a given manner.”431
The Court’s examples of arbitrary decision making underscore its
insistence upon the hallmarks of expert discretion: decisions must be
thoroughly reasoned and account for relevant evidence. Thus, in addition to
addressing “factors” “not intended” by Congress, an agency could flunk
arbitrary and capricious review if it (1) “entirely failed to consider an
important aspect of the problem”; (2) explained its decision on grounds
“counter to the evidence before the agency”; or (3) made an “implausible”
choice that “could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of
agency expertise.”432 If the decision were purely political, as the dissenters
suggested, it is not clear these last three criteria should matter. As long as
the agency stays “within the bounds established by Congress,”433 a court
could instead defer to the administration’s new policy choice as one of the
spoils of the election. If the public is dissatisfied with the administration’s
policies, its remedy rests at the ballot box.
In State Farm, the Justices disagreed on how much expert analysis an
agency must supply in the face of political change, and only five Justices
voted to invalidate NHTSA’s elimination of automatic detachable seatbelt
requirements. When the Agency eliminated these requirements, it offered a
cursory explanation that re-weighed earlier evidence on predicted levels of
seatbelt usage. NHTSA doubted that automatic detachable seatbelts would
result in increased usage, as the predicted increase was based on field studies
considering cars with automatic non-detachable seatbelts and ignition
interlock systems.434 However, the Agency did not address the likelihood
that inertia would cause drivers to leave seatbelts engaged. That was
important because inertia was thought to be a primary reason that motorists
did not buckle up to begin with.
Writing for the majority, Justice White rejected the Agency’s decision
as arbitrary and capricious. The Court started from the premises that “the
430

Id. at 43. Deference will not shelter agencies that fail to exercise expert discretion in the first
instance. Id. at 50 (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) and noting that courts will
not accept “appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalizations” for an agency decision).
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Id. at 48 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, 371 U.S. at 167) (noting that, without these
explanatory requirements, “expertise, the strength of modern government, can become a monster which
rules with no practical limits on its discretion” (internal citation omitted)).
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Id. at 43. Here, NHTSA’s refusal to consider evidence of the safety benefits of airbags also
seemed to violate its statutory obligation to “consider relevant available motor vehicle safety data,” 15
U.S.C. § 1392(f)(1), (3), (4) (1976), and to go against congressional intent that the Agency support its
decisions with “substantial evidence,” S. REP. NO. 89-1301, at 8 (1966), as reprinted in 1966
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2709, 2715–16.
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State Farm, 463 U.S. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Id. at 53 (majority opinion).
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safety benefits of wearing seatbelts are not in doubt” and that Congress
intended safety to be the “pre-eminent factor” in regulatory decisions made
under the Motor Vehicle Safety Act.435 The Court recognized that NHTSA
had some leeway to act without “direct evidence in support” of its position
that detachable automatic seatbelts would not lead to a “substantial increase”
in seatbelt usage.436 It also held that it was “within the agency’s discretion”
to dispute the “generalizability” of studies that supported the earlier findings
of increased seatbelt usage.437 Ultimately, however, the majority believed
that the Agency had failed to offer sufficient explanation for its belief that
detachable automatic belts would not yield a substantial increase in seatbelt
usage. Indeed, evidence from field studies supported the Agency’s earlier
finding that automatic seatbelts would increase safety as well as the policy
choice based on it.438
NHTSA also failed to “bring its expertise to bear” on an important
aspect of the problem when it failed to discuss why inertia—a key factor
limiting manual seatbelt usage—would not also bolster usage rates for
detachable automatic seatbelts.439 Automatic seatbelts, after all, remain in
use unless the occupant overcomes inertia and takes positive action to
disconnect them.440 In addition to the omissions that the Court noted, the
Agency’s initial analysis identifying safety benefits and increased usage
under Modified Standard 208 already was predicated on an assumption that
thirty to forty percent of automatic seatbelts would be disabled.441 The new
rescission order confessed to a “lack of directly relevant data” to substantiate
the Agency’s hunch that drivers would disable detachable seatbelts often
enough to undermine their safety benefits.442
Justice Rehnquist dissented on this issue; he would have upheld
NHTSA’s decision to eliminate passive detachable seatbelts.443 He found it
“reasonable” for the Agency to discount safety benefits premised on an
earlier study that may have incorporated unrealistic assumptions
inapplicable to many drivers.444 Thus, the Agency’s “explanation” of
435
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“substantial uncertainty” as to the benefits of detachable seatbelts was
“adequate” to support the Agency’s decision.445 Further, and most important,
Justice Rehnquist emphasized that a “change in administration . . . is a
perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency’s reappraisal of the costs
and benefits” of existing regulations.446 According to Justice Rehnquist, a
new administration is entitled to assert its distinct, (de)regulatory
“philosophy,” so long as its decisions stay “within the bounds established by
Congress” and rationally “assess administrative records.”447
Thus, none of the Justices found that political change would provide a
complete justification for NHSTA to eliminate passive restraint
requirements altogether. A change in administration did not license the
Agency to utterly disregard evidence that airbags or non-detachable
automatic seatbelts enhanced safety. Justice Rehnquist and three other
Justices found political change sufficient only when the Agency exercised
some discretion by re-weighing record evidence on automatic seatbelts in
light of the new administration’s deregulatory philosophy. A majority of the
Court found that deregulation was not supported by a sufficient analysis of
the existing administrative record.
B. Recent Cases Fail to Resolve the State Farm Division
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions applying arbitrary and capricious
review have failed to command a stable majority on the issues that divided
the Court in State Farm. The Court has failed to resolve the tension between
Justice White’s insistence on decisions supported by an adequate record of
expert analysis and evidence and Justice Rehnquist’s emphasis on deference
to a new President.448 Moreover, the recent retirement of Justice Kennedy,
who provided the deciding vote in the most highly contested cases, adds to
the general uncertainty about the Court’s future direction in this area.
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The Court addressed State Farm in passing when it addressed changed policies in Smiley v.
Citibank (S.D.), 517 U.S. 735 (1996), and National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X
Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005). In Smiley, the Court distinguished the Comptroller’s new rule
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Signs of continued disagreement have been obvious in cases such as the
Court’s 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA.449 Although that case,
which was decided by a five-to-four vote, involved the EPA’s failure to
initiate a rulemaking, rather than an actual change in policy,450 the question
of deference to a politically-based decision not to regulate or exercise expert
discretion loomed large. In an opinion by Justice Stevens, the majority held
that the EPA was required to exercise expert judgment and decide whether
“greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles” would cause or
contribute to the harm associated with climate change, and that its failure to
do so was arbitrary and capricious.451 Justice Kennedy joined Justices
Stevens, Breyer, Souter, and Ginsburg in the majority.452 Jody Freeman and
Adrian Vermeule have noted that Massachusetts v. EPA may amount to
State Farm for a new generation, as it facilitates judicial review and forces
agencies to exercise expertise when making another type of deregulatory
decision that “allegedly injected politics into an expert judgment.”453
Justice Kennedy switched sides in the Court’s next significant
opportunity to clarify State Farm. In its 2009 decision in FCC v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc., the Court reviewed the FCC’s decision to extend
existing prohibitions of “indecent speech” to ban broadcasts of “fleeting
expletives.”454 The case involved a factual and regulatory setting
dramatically different from that of State Farm, as the Commission had
crafted its indecent speech policy around First Amendment concerns and the
Court’s earlier decision in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.455 In Fox, the
Second Circuit had found the Commission’s new indecent speech policy
arbitrary and capricious.456 One of the court of appeals’s primary critiques
focused on the absence of evidence to support the new, higher enforcement
standard.457 According to the court of appeals, the Commission lacked
“evidence that . . . a fleeting expletive is harmful.”458 The court of appeals
also cited this lack of evidence as the reason it “found unconvincing” the
Commission’s prediction that a fleeting expletive exemption “would lead to
increased use of expletives.”459
449
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When the case reached the Supreme Court, the Justices struggled to find
common ground, writing six different opinions.460 Four Justices, including
Justice Kennedy, aligned themselves with Justice Scalia in holding that the
Commission’s change in policy was not arbitrary and capricious or governed
by State Farm.461 Justice Kennedy wrote separately, however, to emphasize
that he would continue to follow State Farm’s arbitrary and capricious
standard in cases (unlike Fox) that involved scientific or technical
expertise.462 Justice Breyer, joined by three other Justices, dissented on the
ground that the Commission’s action was arbitrary and capricious under
State Farm.463
In his opinion for the majority, Justice Scalia first rejected the argument
that the arbitrary and capricious standard imposes a heightened standard of
review for cases in which an agency has changed policy. Instead, the agency
must only “display awareness” of its change and “show that there are good
reasons for the new policy.”464 While the Court did not require that reasons
for the new policy be “better than the reasons for the old [policy],”465 it
distinguished the FCC’s indecent speech policy from policy changes that
implicate reliance interests or are based on “factual findings that contradict
those which underlay its prior policy.”466 The Court went on to explain that
the harm at issue in Fox could not be proved or disproved by “empirical
evidence” because “[o]ne cannot demand a multiyear controlled study, in
which some children are intentionally exposed to indecent broadcasts . . .
and others are shielded from all indecency.”467
The Court majority cited the fact that the subject of the regulation was
not susceptible to objective verification as a key consideration in its
460

Justice Scalia wrote a majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and
Justice Alito, and joined in part by Justice Kennedy. Id. at 504. Justice Thomas concurred separately,
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Amendment concerns relevant to the proceedings on remand. Id. at 530 (Thomas, J., concurring). In his
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468

decision. On the other hand, the dissenting Justices rejected the majority’s
view that the Commission’s decision was not amenable to proof, arguing
that the Commission could have addressed some evidence of harm to
children469 and, most important, that the majority’s analysis could allow
agencies to “change major policies on the basis of nothing more than
political considerations or even personal whim.”470
Justice Scalia’s opinion studiously avoided any reference to Justice
Rehnquist’s partial dissent in State Farm, and he did not address political
considerations except in the part of his opinion that responded to the dissents
of Justices Breyer and Stevens.471 As previously noted, Justice Kennedy
declined to join in this part of Justice Scalia’s opinion, which therefore
commanded the votes of only four Justices. Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion
rejected calls for heightened scrutiny because the Commission’s policy
change “was spurred by significant political pressure from Congress.”472
And because the Commission is an independent agency, its politically
motivated policy decision did not reflect the presidential control involved in
State Farm.
Justice Kennedy agreed that the Commission’s change in policy was not
arbitrary and capricious, but he wrote separately to emphasize “background
principles,” and to express his concern with respect to policy changes in
areas of scientific or technical expertise. According to Justice Kennedy, a
“more reasoned explanation” may be appropriate when “discoveries in
science” or technological advances alter reasons for a longstanding policy.473
In these instances, “a substantial body of data and experience can shape and
form the new rule,” and the agency’s decision must be “explained in light of
available data” and be “informed by the agency’s experience and
expertise.”474
Justice Kennedy described the agency’s obligation in apolitical terms,
and explained that the APA imposes on agencies a “duty . . . to find and
formulate policies that can be justified by neutral principles and a reasoned
explanation.”475 This standard precludes an agency from “simply
disregard[ing] contrary or inconvenient factual determinations that it made
in the past.”476 Justice Kennedy thus indicated that he would follow State
468
Id. at 519 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 43, 46–56 (1983)).
469
See id. at 564 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the Commission could have addressed studies
suggesting that children are too young to comprehend sexual innuendo, but failed to do so).
470
Id. at 551–52.
471
Id. at 523–29 (majority opinion).
472
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Farm in cases where the agency’s initial policy was supported by factual
findings,477 but Fox did not raise the same concerns because the Commission
based its prior “policy on [the Supreme Court’s opinion in] . . . FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation” rather than on “factual findings.”478
In sum, Fox seems to raise more questions than it answers about the
proper standard of review for an agency’s change in policy. The Justices not
only disagreed on the lawfulness of the FCC’s change in policy, but they
also disagreed on how broadly State Farm’s test should apply.479 The
reasoned awareness standard from Justice Scalia’s majority opinion might
be read to align with Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in State Farm, but only
three Justices joined the part of Justice Scalia’s opinion that supported a
policy outcome that seemed to reflect congressional pressure.480 Justices
Kennedy, Breyer, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg expressed reservations
about this diluted standard and about the propriety of change grounded in
political considerations alone. These Justices noted that they would adhere
to State Farm, at least when the agency changed fact-based policies or where
technical or scientific expertise is relevant.481
The Court’s most recent decision, Department of Commerce v. New
York, reveals the Justices’ continued disagreement over the arbitrary and
capricious standard of review. As noted above, the Secretary of Commerce’s
controversial decision to add a citizenship question drew shifting coalitions
of five Justices, with Chief Justice Roberts providing the deciding vote on
both issues. The four “more conservative” Justices joined the Chief Justice’s
opinion on the initial determination that the Secretary’s action was not
arbitrary and capricious because it was “supported by the evidence before
him.”482 On a second inquiry into the adequacy of the Secretary’s
explanation for his decision, however, the four “more liberal” Justices joined
the Chief Justice in holding that the Secretary acted arbitrarily and
capriciously because his stated rationale was “pretextual.”483 The Court
477
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affirmed the district court’s remand to the Agency based on its finding of
pretext.484
Chief Justice Roberts’s initial assessment of evidentiary support for the
Secretary’s decision implicitly favored Justice Rehnquist’s more deferential
approach in State Farm. Although the Chief Justice did not mention Justice
Rehnquist’s partial dissent, he evaluated the decision of a political appointee
with the same deference due to a predictive scientific determination:
Secretary Ross’s explanation needed only to lie “within the bounds of
reasoned decisionmaking” under Baltimore Gas.485 Under this deferential
version of arbitrary and capricious review, it was “reasonable” for the
Secretary to conclude “that reinstating a citizenship question was worth the
risk of a potentially lower response rate,” particularly in light of the long
history of the citizenship question being posed on earlier versions of the
census.486 Chief Justice Roberts dismissed the dissent’s more searching
review as an intrusive decision that effectively subordinated “the Secretary’s
policymaking discretion to the Bureau’s technocratic expertise.”487 Instead,
the majority held that the Secretary was entitled to discount the Bureau’s
expert predictions of lowered response rates as “inconclusive.”488 Still, the
majority failed to address the Secretary’s refusal to supplement the Bureau’s
analysis and gather additional empirical evidence through routine testing.
Nor did the majority on that issue address Justice Scalia’s earlier suggestion,
in FCC v. Fox, that “failure to adduce empirical data that can readily be
obtained” might render a policy change arbitrary and capricious.489
The dissent’s contrary view relied heavily on the majority opinion from
State Farm. As Justice Breyer noted in an opinion joined by Justices Kagan,
Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, State Farm set important limits on an agency’s
ability to “exercise its judgment in moving from the facts and probabilities
on the record to a policy conclusion.”490 An agency cannot “merely recite
the terms ‘substantial uncertainty’ as a justification for its actions,”491 and it
typically must explain a decision to take action without “engaging in a
search for further evidence.”492 The Secretary’s explanation failed to satisfy
these requirements. Not only did his decision contradict evidence showing
484
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U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. at 2590 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
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that the citizenship question would likely reduce the accuracy of citizenship
data,493 but it avoided routine tests designed to gather and provide additional
evidence on the question’s likely effect. Reliance on the citizenship
question’s historical pedigree failed to address more recent evidence based
on the use of a citizenship question in a survey provided to a small sample
of the population. This evidence revealed disparate “no answer” rates for
certain segments of the population and suggested that a universal citizenship
question was “likely [to] cause a disproportionate number of noncitizens and
Hispanics to go uncounted.”494 The majority’s deferential approach glossed
over these omissions.
If the Court had resolved the case on this first issue alone, the decision
might have signaled a shift toward greater accommodation of political
discretion in agency decisions. However, procedural irregularities provided
a rare occasion for the Court to consider the Secretary’s subjective
motivations. The five-to-four split on this second issue muddied the waters
regarding the proper role of political motivation. Chief Justice Roberts’s
majority opinion focused on the “significant mismatch between the decision
the Secretary made and the rationale he provided.”495 The Chief Justice
emphasized that this case turned on “unusual circumstances,”496 and noted
that a “court may not set aside an agency’s policymaking decision solely
because it might have been . . . prompted by an Administration’s
priorities.”497 Based on that fact, the dissent expressed the hope that Chief
Justice Roberts’s decision would prove “a ticket good for this day and this
train only,”498 but the dissent also argued that the majority’s approach would
encourage future litigants to challenge administrative decisions that
reflected political pressure from the White House.499 Thus, the Court’s fiveto-four ruling on pretext fails to clarify the appropriate role of political
influence.
In a case limited to a traditional administrative record, the Justices’
deferential approach to arbitrary and capricious review under Baltimore Gas
would likely govern. None of the opinions expressly mentioned the
late-breaking evidence documenting Dr. Hofeller’s clandestine role in
orchestrating a racially-motivated citizenship question. This new evidence
not only involved unlawful discrimination,500 but also raised significant
questions about the deference owed to Secretary Ross’s evaluation of record
evidence. In particular, Dr. Hofeller’s 2015 study suggests that the Secretary
may have already credited secret evidence that a citizenship question would
493

Id. at 2592.
Id. at 2584.
495
Id. at 2575 (majority opinion).
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Id. at 2576.
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Id. at 2753.
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Id. at 2584 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Id. at 2583.
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depress responses by Hispanics. The majority’s finding of pretext implicitly
addressed this concern in the immediate case, and happenstance is unlikely
to again expose similar influences operating behind the scenes of agency
decisions.
Still, the Court missed a legitimate and important opportunity to limit
agency use of undisclosed evidence in future cases. By applying a
deferential standard under Baltimore Gas, the majority glossed over the fact
that the Secretary chose to base his decision on limited empirical evidence,
and resulting uncertainty, when he bypassed the testing routinely employed
for new census questions. Hofeller’s study suggests a sinister explanation
for the Secretary’s choice. That is, it is possible that Hofeller’s study had
already convinced the Secretary of the desirability of the citizenship
question based on its predicted effects on “Non-Hispanic Whites”501 and that
the Secretary evaded routine testing to suppress additional public evidence
on this point. While it is not realistic to expect administrators to confess their
true motives for regulatory action, especially the kind of motives that seem
to be involved here, a decision to exclude readily obtainable evidence from
an administrative record should be highly suspect. Here, a decision that the
Secretary acted arbitrarily and capriciously by evading standard testing
procedures would eliminate the need to consider subjective motivation. At
the same time, it would prevent an administrator from basing his decision
on secret evidence when relevant public evidence could readily be had.
Justice Breyer’s call for greater scrutiny under the majority approach in State
Farm would promote policy decisions based on public consideration of
reasonably available evidence and check private agendas supported by
hidden studies.
V. EXPERT ANALYSIS ADVANCES THE GOALS OF TRANSPARENT,
DYNAMIC, AND EVIDENCE-BASED DECISION MAKING
While the Justices have expressed divergent views on the proper role of
agency expertise, the academic community has also failed to develop a
modern framework that acknowledges the value of agencies’ expert analysis
in the face of policy change.502 Three leading approaches to agency change
focus on political control, deliberative democracy, and the rule of law. The
political control approach reflects a recently dominant general theory of
administrative law, favors Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in State Farm, and
would allow agencies greater latitude to substitute political concerns for
expert analysis. The deliberative democracy and rule of law approaches
501
In the study, Hofeller analyzed data from surveys of a small portion of the population and
concluded that addition of a citizenship question would be “advantageous to Republicans and
Non-Hispanic Whites in redistricting.” See Letter to Clerk of the Court, supra note 132, at 4.
502
Shapiro, supra note 16, at 1097, 1099 (noting the “impoverished understanding of expertise” in
rulemaking and describing “craft expertise” which operates alongside traditional scientific or economic
analysis).
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favor the majority holding in State Farm and retain more demanding
requirements of expert analysis. As explained below, expert analysis affords
more transparency than the political control approach and also supports and
enhances the deliberative democracy and rule of law approaches.
A. The Political Control Model Undermines Transparent and EvidenceBased Decision Making Informed by Expertise
In Presidential Administration, Elena Kagan argued that Presidents
should have increased authority to influence the policies of administrative
agencies.503 To that end, Kagan rejected the doctrine’s “ideal vision of the
administrative sphere as driven by experts” and called for relaxation of the
State Farm doctrine.504 Kagan does not reject expertise entirely, but she
would place the ultimate responsibility for expert decision making in the
President,505 while relying on the President’s sense of self-restraint as the
principal means for avoiding unwise intrusions in highly technical areas
such as environmental protection.506 In place of a system based on technical
expertise, Kagan urges a “revised doctrine” that would apply arbitrary and
capricious review in a way that “center[s] on the political leadership and
accountability provided by the President.”507 Kagan’s position aligns most
closely with Justice Rehnquist’s partial dissent in State Farm, that is, she
agrees that a “rescission emanat[ing] from regulatory views held by the
President” need not be “justif[ied] . . . in neutral, expertise-laden terms to
the fullest extent possible.”508
Kathryn Watts has echoed Kagan’s approach in an article that advocates
greater deference to political considerations in arbitrary and capricious
review.509 According to Watts, State Farm’s hard look review “currently
hinges on an outmoded model of ‘expert’ decisionmaking.”510 She notes that
a change “enabling courts to credit openly political judgments would help to
bring hard look review . . . into harmony with other major administrative law
doctrines that embrace the more current ‘political control’ model.”511 But
neither Watts nor Kagan concurs fully in Justice Rehnquist’s partial dissent
in State Farm. Instead, both argue that the Reagan Administration did not
503

Kagan, supra note 6, at 2380.
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505
For a critique arguing that the President cannot “displace the agency head’s discretion to make
decisions vested in that officer by law,” see Thomas O. Sargentich, The Emphasis on the Presidency in
U.S. Public Law: An Essay Critiquing Presidential Administration, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 7 (2007).
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Kagan, supra note 6, at 2354–56.
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Id. at 2381.
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See Watts, supra note 9, at 2 (“[T]his Article argues for expanding current conceptions of
arbitrary and capricious review. . . .”).
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sufficiently explain the political reasons for rescinding automatic detachable
seatbelt requirements. According to Kagan, NHTSA’s decision lacked
“candid and public acknowledgement of the presidential role in shaping an
administrative decision.”512 Watts likewise faults NHTSA for failing to
openly discuss political factors such as “its reliance on the Administration’s
overall priorities.”513 Had NHTSA emphasized these political concerns,
Watts continues, its “explanation should have been enough (combined with
its focus on facts and logic) to constitute a reasonable and adequate
explanation for the rescission” of the previous administration’s
requirements.514
The problem with this approach, however, is that political actors often
prefer opaque explanations, or, in the words of Alexander Hamilton,
“secrecy.”515 Nina Mendelson has addressed the transparency problems
created by “silence” about the “content of White House influence” on
agency rules,516 explaining that “Presidents (and OIRA) have often chosen
to lie low with respect to particular agency decisions.”517 For that reason,
Mendelson has argued, arbitrary and capricious review cannot bring about
adequate disclosures, and congressionally mandated disclosure rules are
therefore necessary to prompt transparency.518
Likewise, OIRA review of proposed rules tends to be opaque, creating
“unrestricted and nontransparent opportunities for political oversight and
editing of agency technical analyses.”519 Even when political actors give
reasons for their actions, they may not be candid, and an administration that
wishes to conceal the influence of a special interest group, for example,
would likely “couch its decision as being based on opposition to intrusive
and needless government regulation.”520 The fortuitous discovery of
clandestine political motives in the census case further illustrates the
inherent problems with a framework that expects agencies to divulge
political reasons for their decisions.521 This tendency to conceal political
512

Kagan, supra note 6, at 2382.
Watts, supra note 9, at 72.
514
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THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 249, at 402–03 (describing secrecy as an attribute of the
energetic executive).
516
Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH.
L. REV . 1127, 1130 (2010). See also id. at 1159 (noting that “agencies usually submerge executive
influence or control” when explaining policy decisions).
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Id. at 1166.
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See id. (stating that an “approach that is more receptive to political reasons likely would be
insufficient to prompt” more disclosure).
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Wagner (2015), supra note 16, at 2046.
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Seidenfeld, supra note 10, at 178. The Trump Administration, however, has openly referred to
the industry interests protected by its policies. See also Heinzerling, supra note 63, at 36 (“Agencies have
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motives prevents voters from holding the President accountable for agency
policy choices, even though accountability is a fundamental justification that
scholars like Elena Kagan advance for favoring presidential control to begin
with.
Expert analysis has far more potential to enhance transparency within a
politically motivated framework. Transparent analyses of scientific,
technological, or economic evidence can legitimize agency decisions by
demonstrating consistency with both congressional mandates and generally
accepted scientific norms.522 Such analyses serve to show whether an agency
has complied with its statutory mandate or succumbed to political pressure
to ignore relevant facts or disregard the public interest.523 Moreover, as
Sidney Shapiro, Elizabeth Fisher, and Wendy Wagner have recently
explained, independent expert analysis can “speak[] truth to power” by
pointing out how political goals may be “inconsistent with scientific and
policy evidence.”524 Even when expert agency conclusions ultimately yield
to political concerns (such as the potential cost of regulation), expert analysis
will add transparency to the process and illuminate the political tradeoffs
that are being made.525 In some cases, expert analysis may also constrain
agency discretion and limit politically driven results at the agency level.
William Buzbee notes that even under the Trump Administration, for
example, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission “unanimously
declined a request by the Department of Energy to change policies to support
the coal industry, finding it legally and factually without merit.”526 Expert
analysis of relevant evidence may also support a middle ground between the
polarized positions staked out by pro- and anti-regulatory zealots.527 Finally,
expert analysis can facilitate judicial review to check overly politicized
agency decisions that fail to supply adequate expert analysis. As previously
noted, courts have repeatedly struck down regulatory rollbacks when Trump
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Wagner (2015), supra note 16, at 2028–29 (noting that expert regulation in the United States is
marked by “[t]ransparency, peer and public scrutiny”).
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Shapiro et al., supra note 16, at 490.
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Buzbee, supra note 10, at 1423 (citing Order Terminating Rulemaking Proceeding, Initiating
New Proceeding, and Establishing Additional Procedures, 162 FERC Par. 61,012 (Jan. 8, 2018));
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Administration officials had failed to discuss inconvenient facts or show that
their conclusions were supported by expert analysis.528
Arbitrary and capricious review also has the potential to bolster both the
transparency and the quality of expert agency analysis. Under the
deliberative process privilege, for example, agencies may withhold internal
scientific recommendations provided to political agency heads.529 If an
agency fails to communicate its ultimate conclusions on these
recommendations, however, it may flunk arbitrary and capricious review
because it will have failed to consider an important aspect of the problem.
Further, the arbitrary and capricious review provisions of APA section 706
may bolster notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures by requiring
agencies to provide the courts with the “whole record” of scientific studies
or other materials that were considered by the agency.530
A final problem is that agencies tend to disclose expert analysis to a
fault: they are so much more comfortable disclosing expert analysis that they
may sometimes generate such analyses to mask unseemly political
influences.531 Arbitrary and capricious review places some limits on an
agency’s ability to manufacture a scientific charade, however, because an
agency ultimately cannot offer “an explanation for its decision that runs
counter to the evidence before” it.532 All in all, a system premised on expert
analysis promotes transparency and the consideration of scientific,
technological, or economic evidence mandated by Congress far better than
one premised on politics. And without sufficient transparency, it is doubtful
that the political control model can achieve its ultimate goal of holding the
President electorally accountable for an agency’s policy choices.533
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(1983). As Wendy Wagner argues, it may also be that the system needs further reforms in order to isolate
scientific and policy judgments. Wagner (1995), supra note 25, at 1709, 1714, 1719. In addition, other
reforms may be needed to reveal OIRA and the executive branch’s involvement in revisions of agency
technical findings. Mendelson, supra note 516, at 1145. While these analyses show that expert analysis
may not be perfect, on balance it remains superior to politically-oriented reforms that could eliminate
expert analysis entirely. Seidenfeld, supra note 10, at 182–83 (eliminating expert analysis to avoid a
science charade would be the same as eliminating real estate disclosures to avoid lies told by some
sellers).
533
Of course, electoral accountability is itself imperfect. See Staszewski, supra note 10, at 868
(noting that election results will not influence all executive decisions or those made during a President’s
second term).
529

78

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1

B. The Exercise of Expertise Furthers Transparent Deliberative
Democracy and Can Add Legitimacy to the Decision Making Process in
Circumstances When Agencies Must Act Without Public Deliberation
An important response to the political control approach questions the
legitimacy of agency decisions that are based primarily on the President’s
political goals. Glen Staszewski’s 2012 article argues that the political
control model is inferior to an approach based on deliberative democracy.
Deliberative democracy “focuses on the obligation of public officials to
engage in reasoned deliberation on which courses of action will promote the
public good.”534 It checks the “tyranny of the majority,” encourages agencies
to include minority interests in the weighing of competing viewpoints, and
promotes the goal of “reach[ing] the best decisions on the merits in light of
the available information.”535 Only grounds that “could reasonably be
accepted by free and equal citizens with fundamentally competing
perspectives” will satisfy the “reasoned explanation” requirement.536
Basic tenets of deliberative democracy align with State Farm’s
requirement of expert analysis. State Farm requires agencies to consider all
“important aspect[s]” of a problem, explain decisions in a manner consistent
with the “evidence before the agency,” and reach a conclusion that can
plausibly “be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise.”537 Notions of deliberative democracy also align with Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence in Fox, which called for agency decisions that are
explained “in light of the data available,” are “informed by the experience
and expertise of the agency,” and “can be justified by neutral principles and
a reasoned explanation.”538 The approach taken in Justice Rehnquist’s partial
dissent in State Farm, on the other hand, eviscerates these deliberative
standards and gives expert analysis second seat to executive preferences. 539
Mark Seidenfeld’s related critique develops a helpful synthesis that
captures the relationship between political influence and State Farm’s
apolitical, reasoned decision making requirement. Seidenfeld distinguishes
motivations from justifications and notes that judicial review focuses solely
on the latter. As a result, “hard-look review does not second guess legitimate
policy decisions by agencies that are motivated by raw politics.”540 Instead,
it simply “prohibit[s] decisions that cannot be justified by anything other
534
Id. at 857. See also Short, supra note 10, at 1816 (arguing that Watts’s approach will undermine
incentives to make reasoned decisions using expert staff).
535
Staszewski, supra note 10, at 858.
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Id. at 857.
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State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43; Staszewski, supra note 10, at 912 (concluding that deliberative
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judicial review”).
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than raw politics.”
This distinction and accommodation of political
influence is crucial. It provides for reasoned decision making within a
framework that addresses a central, political control critique of agency
decision making, namely, that agencies lack the President’s political energy
to bring about policy change.542 Seidenfeld’s explanation accommodates
change initiated at the President’s bidding, so long as the agency’s ultimate
policy decision can be justified by more than raw politics and incorporates
the kind of reasoned analysis of relevant evidence contemplated by State
Farm.
Further, as Seidenfeld notes, attempts to legitimize the substitution of
political motivations for reasoned justifications will undermine transparency
and relieve “the agency of its obligation to reveal the full implications of its
rulemaking.”543 Thus, in addition to checking raw political decisions that
cannot be justified by record evidence, expert analysis promotes transparent
decision making. This sort of transparency may enhance political
accountability and better inform voters.544 In addition, disclosure of expert
analysis may inform scientific or expert communities about important areas
of regulatory inquiry and therefore facilitate advances in scientific or other
fields of knowledge.
What deliberative democracy may not explain, however, are cases in
which agencies appropriately engage in dynamic decision making outside of
a more formal and public deliberative process. The Federal Reserve Open
Market Committee’s “exceptionally rapid and proactive” expert policy
response to the 2007–08 financial crisis545 is but one example of the many
significant but informal actions that agencies can implement without noticeand-comment rulemaking or more formal procedures.546 Indeed, the APA
even specifies certain circumstances in which agencies may make binding
rules without the deliberation required by notice-and-comment procedures.
For example, under section 553(b),547 an agency may publish a binding
policy decision without notice-and-comment procedures if it has and cites
record evidence of “good cause” for immediate action. This exception calls
541
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for streamlined expert judgments—consideration of record facts and a rough
cost-benefit analysis of whether immediate public safety or other emergency
circumstances outweigh the need for more thorough deliberation.548
The good cause exception allows agencies to impose rules summarily,
but it cannot be used to circumvent expert analysis in favor of raw politics.
The Trump Administration’s attempts to stretch the good cause exception to
accommodate immediate political change and “regulated industry” interests
have been rejected as “inconsistent with legal precedent on the nature of
‘good cause.’”549 Even though exigent circumstances preclude more lengthy
deliberation, expert decision making and the consideration of record
evidence are still needed to provide a check on arbitrary regulatory change.
Expertise adds legitimacy to decisions made without lengthy deliberation,
and it aligns with deliberative democracy by providing a reasonable ground
for decision that could be acceptable to citizens with competing
perspectives.
C. Expert Analysis Advances the Rule of Law by Stabilizing Policy and
Curtailing Administrative Policy Change Based on Whim
Some of the most recent criticisms of administrative agencies, such as
those voiced by Justice Gorsuch, have called for greater limits on the ability
of agencies to change policies based on “bureaucratic whim.”550 This
critique reflects rule of law concerns, especially when agencies invoke
Chevron deference to justify changed interpretations of regulatory statutes.
Randy Kozel and Jeff Pojanowski’s analysis anticipates such objections.
They offer a rule of law approach that would limit agency change and give
courts greater ability to impose static interpretations of congressional
intent.551 But their analysis does not impose similar rule of law constraints
548
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on policy decisions that are left open by statute and involve “prescriptive”
reasoning based on economic or other expert analysis.552
As William Buzbee recently pointed out, however, it is “exceedingly
rare” that statutory “language requires one particular policy action.”553
Buzbee argues that judicial consistency doctrines have also checked
bureaucratic whim in policy decisions that Congress has delegated to
agencies. He describes State Farm’s majority opinion as the “foundational
modern case” that establishes a “consistency doctrine.”554 Proposals to move
away from the State Farm majority and facilitate impulsive political change
do not adequately account for “the Supreme Court’s persistent doctrinal
emphasis” on the need for agency analysis of “underlying facts, science,
circumstances, the record, and the agency’s past reasoning” before changing
policies.555 The Court’s reasoned decision making requirements have a
stabilizing effect on policy and provide “a brake on erratic or unexplained
sudden change.”556
Expert analysis of relevant evidence supports these rule of law values.
Although underlying technical or scientific evidence will change, the time it
takes to engage in expert analysis tends to promote reasoned analysis,
stabilize policy, and limit sudden or adventitious change.557 Critically, this
consistency doctrine does not operate like stare decisis, impose a substantive
preference in favor of earlier policy decisions, or restrict agencies to
traditional judicial methods of decision making. Buzbee notes, for example,
that the Trump Administration “probably” has the power to “substantially
revise the many rules” it began to reconsider in 2017–18.558 The primary
impediments to change are analytical steps that foreclose impulsive policy
swings: Presidents cannot direct agencies to “short-circuit the regulatory
process” and shirk reasoned decision making “that frankly addresses both
supportive and contrary evidence.”559
These analytical requirements may create obstacles for the Trump
Administration. The EPA’s initial efforts to undo the Waters of the United
States Rule and the Clean Power Plan, for example, did not call for more
552
Id. at 160 (siding with Rehnquist’s partial dissent in State Farm and noting that “the agency was
within its rights to reverse itself” on detachable seatbelts).
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thorough analysis of these major policy changes. The EPA expanded its
analysis only after courts rejected many of the Administration’s early
attempts to impose immediate change by fiat.561 As a result, the EPA did not
begin more earnest analytical efforts until over a year into Trump’s first term
and amidst churning leadership at both the Agency and the Executive Office
of the President. If the Trump Administration ultimately fails to support its
rollbacks with expert analysis of relevant evidence, its policies are unlikely
to survive judicial review. And even if inadequately supported policies
somehow survived judicial review, they would be especially vulnerable to
revision by future administrations. Future administrations would generally
be required to analyze contrary evidence supporting decisions made by past
administrations, but that would present no obstacle here, as no such evidence
would exist.562
CONCLUSION
The Trump Administration has failed to recognize the importance of
expert analysis in politically directed policy change. Its position aligns with
Justice Rehnquist’s partial dissent in State Farm,563 as well as with two
recently popular views in administrative law scholarship: the desirability of
presidential control of administration and the tendency to view expertise as
an anachronistic relic of the New Deal. The latter view has posed an
especially formidable obstacle to recognizing the continued importance of
expertise in government regulation. Even scholars who have opposed strong
claims for executive power, and have supported the need for reasoned
decision making, have nevertheless under-theorized the role of expert
analysis within a regulatory framework that acknowledges the need for
political input.
To address that shortcoming, this Article identifies a critical role for
expert analysis within a dynamic and politically guided framework. Change
is not the exclusive province of the executive; it is also a central aspect of
much of the expert decision making that Congress has delegated to agencies.
Within our system, agencies possess unique advantages in accommodating
changing bodies of scientific, technological, and economic data in the
formulation of regulatory policy.

560
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State Farm’s requirement of reasoned, expert analysis also has a distinct
capacity for promoting transparent decision making. Transparency in the
regulatory context benefits the public and the academic and scientific
communities as well as those directly affected by regulation. Further, if
agencies must justify policies through reasoned, expert analysis of relevant
scientific, technological, or economic evidence, they may also have an
incentive to adopt policies that make sense to groups beyond the President’s
base of support, thereby strengthening public confidence in government.
Decisions based on reasoned, public analysis of relevant evidence may
afford greater legitimacy than policies that are adopted without explanation
and seem to reflect nothing more than the current preferences of an
administration’s political appointees. Expert analysis may also add
legitimacy to expedited agency decisions that are appropriately conducted
outside of a public notice-and-comment rulemaking process.564
Lower courts have unquestioningly applied State Farm’s reasoned
decision making test to check the Trump Administration’s impulsive and
insufficiently reasoned policy changes.565 Indeed, in some cases, early losses
in court have appeared to motivate the current administration to supplement
proposed rulemaking dockets with expert analysis that it originally refused
to provide.566 These initial judicial decisions also reinforce the value of
reasoned, expert analysis on fundamental questions of national policy made
within a politically directed framework. Presidential administrations may
come and go, but their regulatory legacies will ultimately depend on their
ability to support administrative change with reasoned analysis of relevant
scientific, technological, or economic evidence.
It is too early, at the time of this writing, to say whether the Supreme
Court will be able to resolve its own internal conflicts concerning the proper
role of expertise in policy change. But the Court may have become less
inclined to defer to executive discretion and control (as shown in the
mounting criticism of Chevron) and more concerned with the need to check
administrative decisions that appear to be based on personal “whim”567 or
hidden animus. Even early proponents of presidential control, such as
now-Justice Kagan, may not have envisioned what may ensue when a
President lacks respect for the legal and expert limits within which agencies
have been thought to operate.568 The Court’s limited and divided rulings in
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President Trump has recently complained that certain of his immigration policies have been
blocked by “Obama” judges rather than proper members of an independent judiciary. Katie Reilly,
President Trump Escalates Attacks on ‘Obama Judges’ After Rare Rebuke from Chief Justice, TIME
(Nov. 21, 2018, 6:32 PM), https://time.com/5461827/donald-trump-judiciary-chief-justice-john-roberts/.
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Department of Commerce v. New York fail to provide a workable framework
with which to address these concerns in future cases. Justices concerned with
executive self-indulgence and duplicity may ultimately find comfort by
returning to the reasoned decision making requirements of Justice White’s
majority opinion in State Farm.

See also Tony Mauro, Trump Portrays Supreme Court as Key Player in DACA, Border Wall Fights,
NAT’L L.J. (Jan. 3, 2019, 6:23 PM), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2019/01/03/trumpportrays-supreme-court-as-key-player-in-daca-border-wall-fights/?slreturn=20190112120134 (stating
that the President’s predictions that the Supreme Court will condone his DACA policy have been
described as displaying “a disgraceful degree of disrespect for the Supreme Court and the role of an
independent federal judiciary”).

